Atomic Bomb on Japan
It is about 75 years since the United States used the Atomic Bomb on Japan during WWII and every individual appears to arrive at a different conclusion about the use of such cruel weapons on another state killing civilians. For years, there have been arguments on the United States’ right to use two atomic bombs on Japan at a time when the country had already been weakened in the final week of WWII. While the groups against bombing have delivered their evidence such as Japan had already been weakened and their surrender was imminent, this essay disagrees and demonstrates why the United States was Justified to use the Atomic Bomb during WWII.
It was on the morning of August 6, 1945, when the American B-29 Enola Gay dropped an atomic bomb on the city of Hiroshima causing about 130, 000 deaths (Kolokolova, Terekhova, and Kolesnikova, 110). On the third day, August 9, 1945, B-29, Bock’s Car delivered the second drop at the city of Nagasaki killing over 50,000 people (Kolokolova et al. 112). The two bombings caused serious casualties as well as physical destruction. The two catastrophic actions have haunted the American conscience since then. The agitation expressed towards the Smithsonian institution’s Enola Gay exhibit as we as the mushroom-cloud postage stamp are just but few examples (Kolokolova et al. 111). While Harry S. Truman, as well as the relevant officials, have argued that the bombing made Japan surrender, thus eliminating bloody invasion, the opponents have claimed that they failed to explore the best alternatives and instead, only focused on making the Soviet Union understand their power as opposed to defeating they knew was already falling.
It is argued that through rational calculation, Japan had already been beaten in Summer 1945. The conventional bombing had indeed ruined several cities in Japan at a time when Blockade also had a severe impact on their importation of vital materials (Forge, 65). Their navy equally had suffered loses and everyone suspected that they could not withstand the invasion. Unfortunately, rational calculations failed to identify Japan’s position. While other sects in the government wished for the war to end as long as specific terms were met, the Japanese militants were ready for war despite the outcome (Espinosa,104). They indicated that they were ready for the invasion of the home islands, threatening cause severe casualties that will make the United States retreat from their policy of unconditional surrender (Reed,89). Since the militarist had extreme power over the administration and was capable of disregarding the order from emperor, since they had done it before, with the argument that civilian advisors were misleading the emperor, it was not possible to predict their next move as indicated by Espinosa, (106). Hence, bombing to bring down the war was a justifiable course.
It is also known that Okinawa was the only place that could offer details of what invasion of the home islands would cause. It is confirmed that as from April 1, the Japanese had put a fight with a vigor that indicated opposite of the expectation to see their will to resist evading. They had caused over 50,000 casualties on the invaders (Kolokolova et al. 114), most of which were a result of the use of Kamikazes at an extreme level. Again, they equally released their super battleship, Yamato, to a suicide mission to Okinawa. The aim was that after destroying the American ships offshore, it was also to destroy the shore. Even though Yamato was destroyed immediately after leaving the port, its mission demonstrated the willingness of the Japanese to employ their resources to fight the battle to last (Espinosa,106). Thus, it was risky to sustain and extend the fight while hoping for their surrender that might have come with a surprise of American losing more solders and japan losing more citizens.
The Japanese appeared much prepared to defend their sacred homeland with much force, with kamikazes placed at short range, the impact would have been more horrifying than at Okinawa. They had over 2,000,000 soldiers training millions of civilians in the home islands, and over a period were keeping aircraft that were to be used to protect the Japanese cities against the intrusion by American bombers (Reed, 90). The data from Tokyo showed that Japan would fight the war to the end. For instance, it is indicated on June 8, an imperial conference formulated, “The Fundamental Policy to Be Followed Henceforth in the Conduct of the War” (Reed, 93), that claimed to fight the war to the bitter end to uphold the national polity as well as safeguard the imperial land, and equally attain their objectives for going to the war (Espinosa,106). Truman and the officials could not know that the claim meant different from what it said; hence, this was a dangerous threat, and using the Atomic bomb was justifiable.
Using the atomic bomb was ethically preferable compared to other alternatives. While critics blame the bombing, they appear to forget the war Japan had over Asia-Pacific. It should be remembered that for every civilian Japanese who died during the war, 18 died across Asia-Pacific (Espinosa,104). How is it possible for the critics to find reasons to justify such and fail to find a reference for the suffering that occurred at Hiroshima and Nagasaki? They all caused suffering and should be treated the same.
According to the information provided by Truman, the atomic bombing eliminated invasion that would have led to about 500,000 deaths of Americans (Espinosa,107). The officials have equally quoted the same figure or more. While critic have claimed that the figures are exaggerations aimed at justifying Truman’s motive, they have produced their figures indicating that casualties would have been about 193,500 (Forge, 67). The idea by critics that 193,500 casualties were not worth making Truman take such a decision is worrying. Though the critics have used these figures generated by the Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC) (Forge, 72), the report itself had issues. For instance, it was a war and, in a war, you cannot have an accurate estimate of casualties at such time. Again, these figures were never with Truman hence his decision to launch the atomic bomb makes sense.
Opponents need to understand that while it is just about 200,000 individuals who died as a result of the bombing, it is quoted that between 300,000-500,000 Japanese (Kolokolova et al. 115), the majority of whom were non-combat either died or disappeared under Soviet captivity. If the war had proceeded, the figures would have gone further higher. Therefore, the atomic bombing equally helped in bringing that to a stop. Finally, while critics blame for altering the demands for unconditional surrender, they should understand that the Japanese administration never placed any terms to end the war before the Hiroshima (Espinosa,106-7). It should be accounted that at the time foreign minister, Shigenori Togo, was told the best offer was unconditional surrender, Togo outrightly objected in the name of the cabinet. And since there was prior evidence in past 2,600 years indicating that Japan ever surrendered, or even their army unit surrendering in the course of the war, American had the right to fear and use all the possible means to put an end to war, thus, the use of the atomic bomb was appropriate.