Operational Art & Design Exam AY 16-17

Operational Art & Design Exam AY 16-17

 Part 1

1. Description of the Operation Environment

The operation environment generally comprised of the land, sea, and the air, all of which marked the special operation. The general plan of the war as was articulated by the US side was to drive the Iraqi forces away from Kuwait. In this context, the plan comprised joint war-based campaigns, which were corrected periodically by the Joint Forces of Iraqi or by the Operations Theater. The central aim of the operations spearheaded by the US was to ensure efficient security of the sovereign state of Kuwait, to ensure the establishment of a fully functioning legislative government in Kuwait and to restore peace in the region by neutralizing the aggression of Iraq. The ground operations were majorly conducted adjacent to the coast[1]. Hence, the coast also formed part of the operating environment. In fact, the dessert shield forces were initially deployed at the coast. Other environmental components included the terrains with relatively established road and infrastructural networks that connect the various Iraqi coastal cities such as the coastal ports. Sabkhas and Sand dunes also existed adjacent to the road. The sand dunes formed significant components of the operating environment because they hindered the efficient flying of some war jets, especially the ones that flew low. The weather that the distinct forces encountered during the war were somehow hostile, with a relative temperature of about 140 degrees Fahrenheit at day time since the war took place between November and March[2]. The temperature shifted to freezing point during the night. The air operational environment majorly comprised Tomahawk operations, which extended the Desert Storm operations in areas such as Western and Baghdad provinces of Iraq[3]. Significantly, this served as a way of crippling the crucial nodes of command and control and the opponent’s air defense networks.

2. Objectives of the U.S. Theater Strategic Level

One of the primary goals of the US Theater Strategic Level was helping encounter the Iraqi Forces strategically to infer the global legitimacy and also create a multinational corporation. This objective was one of the ways of demonstrating the importance of the existence of the national unity endorsement strategic objectives.  Another objective of the US Theater Strategic Level was to create peace in the region by neutralizing the hostility of Iraq while at the same time employing negotiation means to bring the warring parties into terms. The U.S. Theater Strategic Level also aimed at helping in the promotion of partner country and also in the establishment of friendly military contact for the self-defense and multinational operations and other numerous issues about the exchange of meaningful information in the region, for intelligent reasons. Last yet important, the U.S. Theater Strategic Level aimed at facilitating the real-time provision of contingency and enhancing the access of the US forces.

3. Risks

The United States and its Coalition partners accepted risk in immediately deploying elements of the 82d Airborne Division to Saudi Arabia in the early days of OP DESERT SHIELD by assessing and evaluating the sophisticated operational environment for real-time planning. The terrain that formed the original deployment area of the Dessert Shield forces was leveled with fully established connectivity of road networks that connected the coastal cities and other coastal ports within the country. Sabkhas and Sand Dunes, which existed adjacently to the road hindered the operations of the low-flying jets. The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) was viewed as a risk point as it marked one of the sophisticated operation areas. Distinctively, jurisdiction entailed approximately four million squire miles in the operation Dessert Storm across North East Africa to Middle East Asia and to the adjacent central parts of Asia. The area was approximated in fugues to had contained about 550 million people that did not only spoke various languages but also belonged to different religious groups. The regional intricacy served as a challenge because it posed a challenge to the TSC. The complexities described here were risks because they resulted in various logistical glitches in the operation planning process. They also hindered planning for the capabilities of the theater, shortfalls such as political demands and infrastructure.

4. Decisive Points

The primary decisive points of the Dessert Shields that were used in influencing the theater strategic level objectives in the Dessert Storm events included maneuver, which comprised various geographical factors, leadership, which was marked with critical factors,  and the firepower that was marked with function. The maneuver was a dynamic combat element during the war. The forces in the critical environments strategically to leverage surprise advantage, momentum and psychological shock often realize it. In general terms, maneuver focuses on the advantages of positional. Distinctively Firepower was a decisive point by halting the capabilities of the enemy. It suppressed the fire of the enemy. Last yet important, leadership qualified as a decisive point because of most of the important combat power aspects. Good leadership inspired the soldiers to continue fighting to attain the objectives of the war.

5. Culmination

The events that transpired the coalition culminating during the Operation Desert Filed that prevented defeat included troop exhaustion and movement and Fuel Situation. The fast pace of the attack resulted in fuel surplus depletion. In conjunction with the increased movements, there was a shortage of ample time to attack units to download the fuel to the storage points in the ground. This issue limited the ground-trip operations in one way or the other. As a result, the first Armored Division (1AD) was disadvantaged due to the limited fuel supplies. However, the diversion of fuel from the 3AD kept the operations of the 1AD running. From that time to the fourth day of the cease-fire, approximately five of the six M1A1 maneuver brigades equipped divisions ran critically low on fuel.

Movement and troop exhaustion resulted due to a lack of efficient planning and failing to consider the operations of the Dessert Shield across the Arabian Dessert. Strategic logistics could have considered backup bases within the Arabian Desert from the Saudi East, which was the central entry point. The distance amounted to about 400 miles during the start of the traveling point. About eighteen-wheelers were deployed into the operation after 18 days to facilitate the transportation of the combat equipment so that after every one day, they would have covered additional distance. It is also important to note that soldiers and suppliers were already in the field even before the operation began.

6. Ethics

The use of human shields by Saddam Hussein was unethical and could not be justified. Saddam Hussein was holding about 800 nationals of Kuwait during the 1990 Desert Field Operations. He also held Japanese and other nationals from the Western countries involuntary human shields. His strategy aimed at encountering the international coalition forces in Baghdad. The coalition also comprised women and children, all of whom Saddam used as voluntary human shields. He intended to block the foreign nationals from leaving Kuwait, which was presently marred with conflict and hostility. Besides, Saddam also persuaded Iraqi nationals to volunteer as human shields in Iraq.

The use of either voluntary and involuntary human shield was as was used by Saddam is unjustifiable. The Four Geneva conventions of 1949 deduce that the use of the human shield is in contrary to the convention’s provisions as it is forbidden to take either foreigners or citizens as hostages. Precisely, article 3 of the provision prohibits taking humans and using them as shields during international conflict. Saddam’s decision to use human shields was condemned by numerous leaders across the world, showing significant support to the Convention’s articles about the human shield. Military coalitions also swore not to back their tools least the issue of the human shield is solved efficiently. Hence, there is efficient information to prove that the action of the use of human shield by Saddam Hussein was unjustifiable.

Part 2

7. Operational Level end State

A primary operation objective for Operation Desert Storm was the restoration of a legitimate and fully functioning government in Kuwait and to successfully drive the Iraqi troops out of Kuwait territories[4]. The second operational level objective was to restore and nurture peace and security in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf in general. The Operation Desert Storm also aimed at helping in safeguarding and securing Americans who lived in the conflicted area now[5]. Another objective was to foster the provision of real-time contingency and to ensure peaceful access to the US forces.

9. Operation Military Objectives

The primary operation level objective during Operation Desert Storm was to cause maximum destruction as their military power would do. In this regard, they focused on mass destruction, damaging properties, and infrastructure. They aimed at attaining these objectives by attacking airfields and aircraft.

1. Center of Gravity Analysis

9. Maneuver

The maneuver is obtained by deploying forces in strategic areas with an objective of leveraging on the surprise advantage, and operation environment momentum. Broadly, the maneuver is defined as the military’s ability to deploy troops by using firepower and movement to gain position advantage. Effective demonstration of this entails the description of why the General Schwarzkopf’s ground maneuver scheme was supported by the JFACC Commander and the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC)[6].

The maneuver strategy started with the involvement of the US Central Command in the war. Following the deployment of the air supremacy, and just before the commencement of the ground wars, Schwarzkopf’s corps operations were advanced to the western front in terms of size[7]. Precisely, the elements of XVIII were moved approximately two hundred miles into Iran and seventy miles into Iraq. This move halted the technological strategies of Iraq.

10. Operation Line

The LOO type, which suitably characterized General Schwarzkopf’s Operations Approaches for the Desert Storm comprised the offensive campaigns that were geared towards destroying Iraqi chemical, biological production, and nuclear amenities and weapons of mass destruction[8]. The Republican Guard Forces command destruction, neutralization of the Iraqi national command authority, and safeguarding the lives of both local and foreign civilians detained in Iraq and Kuwait. General Schwarzkopf’s Operational Desert Storm Approach also fostered the Southern Iraq occupation as a way of affirming the realization of the strategic objectives[9].

11. Operation Reach

The Operational Reach issues involved in General Schwarzkopf’s ground scheme of maneuver and effects if the ground war had lasted longer include halting of the advancement to fill the operation bases[10]. This issue is explained based on the fast-paced attacks and related operations that depleted the fuel supply quickly. The traveling distance during the commencement period was approximately 400 miles. During this time, about eighteen-wheelers were deployed to transport military equipment to pose a significant impact on their journey. Generally, operation level in the military operation context entailed planning, designing, and executing the military operations. Military level operations depicted a vital understanding of the operating environment. It also enhanced the understanding of other operation-related problems. General Schwarzkopf’s Operational Approach of maneuver by VII corps and other prospective machinery could be used to offer a vivid impression of the operational level method. The primary intent of the VII corps envelopment in the desert storm operation was to aid in the compulsion of the  Republican Guard forces destruction. It was also geared towards ensuring the destruction of the 1^st and the 3^rd armored divisions[11]. The VII corps maneuver success meant the success of the adversary attack. The maneuver is a dynamic combat element that is realized by the deployment of military forces in critical areas to ensure maximum use of surprise advantage, momentum, and psychological shock. VII corps could depend on this strategy to sustain a movement to the east and successfully rebuild their unit and flee the area. Most of the strategies employed by the VII Corps were successful and encountered minimal obstacles. As a result, the Iraqi troops were rendered powerless.

Bibliography

Altomonte, Jenna A. “Witnessing Violence,(Re) Living Trauma: Online Performance Interventions in the Digital Age.” PhD diss., Ohio University, 2017.

Bettwy, Samuel William. “Persian Gulf War: Strategic Effectiveness of American Plans for the Ground Offensive.” Available at SSRN 2604616 (2015).

Hanna, Chris D. Integrating Army Aviation into the Combined Arms Team: Operational Art in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. US Army School for Advanced Military Studies Fort Leavenworth United States, 2017.

[1] of Bettwy, Samuel William. “Persian Gulf War: Strategic Effectiveness of American Plans for the Ground Offensive.” Available at SSRN 2604616 (2015).

[2] Altomonte, Jenna A. “Witnessing Violence,(Re) Living Trauma: Online Performance Interventions in the Digital Age.” PhD diss., Ohio University, 2017.

[3] Hanna, Chris D. Integrating Army Aviation into the Combined Arms Team: Operational Art in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. US Army School for Advanced Military Studies Fort Leavenworth United States, 2017.

[4] Hanna, Chris D. Integrating Army Aviation into the Combined Arms Team: Operational Art in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. US Army School for Advanced Military Studies Fort Leavenworth United States, 2017.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Bettwy, Samuel William. “Persian Gulf War: Strategic Effectiveness of American Plans for the Ground Offensive.” Available at SSRN 2604616 (2015).

[7] Ibid.

[8] Hanna, Chris D. Integrating Army Aviation into the Combined Arms Team: Operational Art in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. US Army School for Advanced Military Studies Fort Leavenworth United States, 2017.

[9] Altomonte, Jenna A. “Witnessing Violence,(Re) Living Trauma: Online Performance Interventions in the Digital Age.” PhD diss., Ohio University, 2017.

[10] Bettwy, Samuel William. “Persian Gulf War: Strategic Effectiveness of American Plans for the Ground Offensive.” Available at SSRN 2604616 (2015).

[11] Hanna, Chris D. Integrating Army Aviation into the Combined Arms Team: Operational Art in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. US Army School for Advanced Military Studies Fort Leavenworth United States, 2017.