Aviation
Abstract
The primary cause of aviation accidents is human error, thus underscoring the need for training pilots. The ensuing report focuses on an accident caused by poor pilot training, which often leads to lack of skill when situations that demand quick and right thinking appear suddenly. The paper begins by introducing the topic, which includes a description of the incident. The thesis statement provided directs the paper’s development toward the targeted topic of training pilots adequately to avoid all types of operational and judgment errors. The accident’s synopsis describes the events that lead up to the accident. The next section expounds the accident’s causes, followed by a presentation of the criteria that led to the decision about the accident’s cause. After that, the findings are analyzed and underscored by using a specific weather theory. The implications of the results are then presented, followed by a host of recommendations on avoiding similar accidents in the future. The study ends with a conclusion and a list of spurting references.
Introduction
The aviation industry is a highly successful venture characterized by highly developed aircraft crewed by extremely qualified and thoroughly evaluated professionals. In the last few years, the aviation industry has seen exponential growth in the number of aircraft providing ferrying services because of the increased number of passengers using air services. Nonetheless, despite the rapid expansion of air business, preventing accidents remains a significant challenge. This global problem has fostered the creation of intensive national and global regulations coupled with a host of agreements to curb the safety risks related to operating aircraft. This case study looks into the Aerospatiale AS350BA, N355NT helicopter crash in the Pacific Ocean, near Hawaii, as seen in National Safety and Transport Board (2007). Although many issues surround this accident, the study aims to expound the cause and determine what the outcomes imply for the aviation industry. This accident is vital because it amplifies the fact of pilot error is the most common cause of aviation accidents. If pilots continue disregarding the dangers associated with ignoring some essential safety measures, more lives will be lost, despite the professionalism of such operators or the aircraft’s high-standard build. The accident analysis will be enabled by referring to various articles that articulate measures of fostering pilot adherence to the established aviation safety rules. The study will highlight the importance of pilots using discretion to make sound judgments, especially when they are on a flight course. Hence, air operators and appropriate aviation regulatory agencies must understand the fundamental approach to use when dealing with matters of aviation and passenger safety.
Thesis Statement
Pilots must be trained in high-level meteorology and practical aircraft management to reduce pilot errors in flight and foster better and quick decision-making to deal with hazardous flight situations.
Synopsis of Incident
As aforementioned, the incident described in this section is the helicopter crash involving the Aerospatiale AS350BA, N355NT helicopter that occurred in the Pacific Ocean near Hawaii. The Aerospatiale AS350BA, N355NT helicopter run by Las Vegas-based Heli-USA Airways, Inc. embarked on a flight on September 23, 2005. The aircraft was operated in adherence to the provisions of the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 that articulated operating requirements and the visual flight rules (VFR). The pilot was also using a company flight schedule to guide the craft. On the fateful day, the aircraft left Lihue Airport (LIH) in Hawaii, intending to travel 45 minutes. The pilot averred that at the time of departure, the weather was favorable, and visibility was clear. He also said that he traveled over the Na Pali Coast at 200 feet above the ground, characterized by good coastline weather. However, at a distance, the pilot averred that as the aircraft approached Kailiu Point and Kee Beach, he saw rain showers off the coastline. The pilot seemed not to have taken caution because he did not attempt to avoid the seemingly small storm. Before long, the aircraft was engrossed in a severe storm that soon overpowered the pilot’s ability to manage the helicopter. This information is contained in the dossier provided by the National Safety and Transport Board (2007) about the incident. Some passengers said that the pilot did not attempt to avoid entering the storm, as the aircraft did not maneuver at all. Soon, they hit a wall of heavy rain and dark, thick clouds. This description meant that they encountered a sudden microburst that eventually overpowered the aircraft’s ability to stay in the air, eventually forcing it to crash. Although the pilot averred that he could see below even when in the storm, one passenger said that nothing was visible in the heavy rain. Just as he was about to engage the pilot, the pilot announced that the craft was turning back. As the pilot was turning the helicopter back, its airspeed fell to zero, and the aircraft began descending rapidly, eventually crashing into the Pacific Ocean. Three passengers died and two others, along with the pilot, received minor injuries.
Causation
The accident’s primary cause was the pilot’s decision to head directly into a storm, particularly because he underestimated the storm’s potential to degenerate from a seemingly moderate rainfall to a highly adverse microburst storm. Before delving into the storm, the pilot had already realized that the area’s visibility was deteriorating due to the weather’s gradually increasing severity. The pilot was inexperienced to know the potential of seemingly “safe” rain showers to deteriorate into severe rainstorms. He should have been aware of the imminent danger and avoided going into the storm immediately he noted the rain showers. The pilot was seemingly only superficially informed about the potential risks of operating an aircraft in such severe weather, primarily because of lightning and thunderstorms that could potentially affect the craft’s stability or effectiveness of its critical operational components. An assessment of the location’s weather status revealed that the Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) prevailed heavily. IMC is a grouping in aviation flight that articulates weather settings that demand pilots to fly using their instruments instead of relying on visual references (Gallo et al., 2015).
Some instances of flying in IMC include flying through fog, blinding rain, heavy clouds, poor visibility, or under 1,000ft above ground level (AGL). Thus, the pilot in this incident was flying through these adverse conditions. As such, pilots must be trained in predicting winds and their circulation to help them understand the interpretation of different weather conditions. A critical requirement of training pilots to understand how to transition from flying in VFR into IMC is echoed by Whitehurst et al. (2019). Moreover, they can also understand how to navigate severe storms if they are caught up in the course of a flight. Accordingly, the theory of circulation and wind patterns provides reliable information on reading and interpreting weather patterns, which would have averted the occurrence of the accident under review.
Further, the pilot had breached the provisions of the operating restrictions in Section 3 of the Special Federation Aviation Regulation 71 that required the helicopter to have flotation emergency systems. These systems help to avert the likelihood of the helicopter sinking after a crash. As such, the Federal Aviation Authority had also erred by underplaying the inspection of these regulations. Consequently, besides the helicopter lacking the flotation instruments, the passengers also lacked adequate flotation equipment. Accordingly, the helicopter crashed resulted in one passenger’s death due to a heart attack caused by drowning, while the entire helicopter frame went underwater.
Decision Criteria
The ultimate conduction was that the accident was primarily attributed to pilot error. The assessment that followed the crash revealed that the pilot did not heed the potential deleterious effect of the seemingly light rain showers he saw. The pilot’s account of the accident’s occurrence conflicts with the statements given by the passengers. According to the passengers, the pilot did not attempt to swerve and avoid going directly into the storm. Instead, he erred in believing that he could maneuver the helicopter though a storm he regarded as light. Further, the situation was exacerbated by the pilot’s lack of the instrument rating, which is a critical requirement for flying in IMC weather conditions. The instrument rating denotes a pilot’s qualification to enable them fly under IMC conditions, as contained in the Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). The pilot’s lack of this vital qualification means that he could not have successfully flown in bad weather. If he was caught up in a severe storm despite not flying directly into the storm as he did, chances remain high that he would still have been unable to negotiate his way out. Ayiei et al. (2020) indicate that GA pilots that operate under the visual flight rules invariably cause accidents upon encountering IMC. Thus, he could not understand how to use his instruments when he suddenly encountered bad weather. As such, without instrument rating, the pilot was already operating from the point of loss when he decided to encounter the storms.
Further, the pilot displayed poor judgment, implying that even if he had the necessary equipment, he would still have gone head-on into the storm. Having the instrument rating is not an automatic pass qualifying a pilot to fly safely in all kinds of weather, notwithstanding the severity. A pilot must hold fast to their minimums and ascertain the effectiveness of their ability to make decisions and make sound risk management principles. For example, the pilot should have noted that the helicopter lacked the necessary flotation equipment and raised the issue with the concerned regulatory agencies. Despite knowing that having such equipment was mandatory in that area, he nonetheless underplayed its importance and continued applying his erred thinking throughout the entire journey. His mistakes are also described by the passengers, despite his contrary indications, as seen in the National Safety and Transport Board (2007)
An incident that helped confirm the causation is the account given by another pilot who received a mayday call from the crashed helicopter’s pilot through the standard traffic advisory frequency (CTAF). After receiving the call, the pilot averred that he struggled to fly his helicopter over the area due to poor visibility. The implication is that the crashed helicopter’s pilot knowingly went into a situation he could not handle, despite knowing the imminent danger. The pilot must have known that he did not have the required instrument rating to head directly into a storm. Further, he knew that his helicopter and passengers lacked the required flotation equipment. All these criteria were considered to identify pilot error as the leading cause of the accident.
Analysis
Any breakdowns or negligence in aviation engenders accidents and deaths. One recognized incident that could have been avoided is the recent helicopter crash that killed basketball legend Kobe Bryant and his entourage. Although not primarily caused by pilot error, it was nevertheless a possible misguided application of operational regulations by the Island Express Helicopters, the owners of the crashed Sikorsky S-76B. The company had an FAA operating certification that restricted its pilots to fly only under visual flight rules. Pilots operating under this provision can only fly in conditions of visibility. Although Bryant’s pilot had the professional qualifications to fly using instruments, he was legally restricted from using this proficiency. The company did not consider the likely deterioration of weather conditions, despite the pilot having embarked on the journey under the required visibility status. The company’s lack of federal certification meant that even though Bryant’s pilot encountered bad weather, there was not much he could do to salvage the situation. He could only rely on visual assistance to navigate through a visually obstructed terrain. The information about this incident and the pilot’s qualifications and legal restrictions is provided by Philipps & Mervosh (2020).
It is appreciable in Bryant’s pilot’s case that the company’s FAA certification requires pilots to observe this condition when carrying passengers. This provision’s relevance is highlighted in the company’s preference for their pilots to avoid ferrying passengers in undesirable weather conditions. However, this provision may be unguided because it is difficult to predict weather changes, and what begins as good weather may suddenly turn and become adverse. As such, the company must review this policy to widen the scope of its pilots’ operations. The pilot could not act despite having the necessary qualifications, which resonates with the Aerospatiale N355NT helicopter’s pilot situation. Both situations required the pilots to have and use instrument rating, considering that the conditions started safely but gradually deteriorated into adverse instrument meteorological conditions (IMC).
Consequently, pilots, company owners, and relevant aviation industry regulatory authorities must understand the fundamental weather theories. Comprehending these theories allows a pilot to make rational decisions when planning for their flights and, most importantly, in handling unforeseen weather emergencies in flight. In both cases, the theory of circulation and wind patterns helps highlight the danger associated with sudden weather changes for pilots. The theory builds on how air density differences engendered by temperature changes generate upward or downward alterations in pressure and attitude. These inharmonious changes create random atmospheric movements that occur horizontally and vertically in the form of wind and currents. The end effect is significantly altered aircraft performance.
In Bryant’s case, the pilot understood the potential negative impact of weather changes because he avoided pulling up when visibility became poor. He understood that pulling up came with the danger of moist air coming off the Pacific Ocean, hitting the mountains, and condensing into thick, low-hanging cloud cover. As such, he sought to negotiate the terrain using other means. However, despite the struggles, he could still not use his instrument rating expertise to negotiate the aircraft due to the legal restrictions. The pilot’s reliance on visual assistance provided detrimental because he realized too late that he was flying too low. The poor conditions thus affected his ability to negotiate the aircraft because the ground assistance also proved inadequate.
The decisions made in both cases show that both accidents involved instrument rating issues. To date, there are still aviation agencies that undermine the vital role played by instrument rating for pilots. The pilots and agencies fully trust the visual flight rules when flying. However, they do not fully comprehend the reality of encountering hostile weather that negates reliance on visual prompts and references. Many accidents have occurred because of pilots attempting to switch from flying VFR into IMC, as noted by Ison (2014). This statistic echoes the problems encountered by pilots in making correct decisions upon encountering adverse weather. Besides, at this point, many pilots without instrument rating lose headway, airspeed, and altitude, as happened with the Aerospatiale AS350BA, N355NT helicopter pilot. In today’s moderately unpredictable climate changes, pilots and the aviation industry regulatory agencies must take the initiative to understand how to enhance knowledge about using instruments. Pilots must understand how to use instruments to manage airspeed, heading, and altitude in hostile weather settings. Additionally, pilots’ understanding of instruments makes them better at predicting weather conditions and rejuvenating the preflight planning engagements to tackle thunderstorms activities and other such weather conditions. Training pilots on instrument rating and other critical air operations allows them to recognize weather hazards beforehand and equips them with the necessary awareness and confidence to handle them. This observation agrees with the recommendations advanced by Thomas (2018) in this regard.
Implications
Failure by the relevant aviation industry’s players to train pilots on handling unexpected weather changes will result in a higher number of aviation accidents. This problem will increase, particularly because of the unpredictable weather changes that are affecting weather conditions globally. These hazardous changes portend poorly for the aviation industry. Despite the positive trend of decreasing general aviation (GA) flight accidents, one problem persists, that of pilots encountering severe weather. Although extensive studies have approached this subject from many viewpoints, initial research has not adequately examined the general aviation pilots’ knowledge and understanding about weather phenomena and notions, and weather products. Moreover, there is minimal understanding of the impacts of such weather aspects to the aviation industry and, more specifically, to flights. The minimal studies imply that up to date, many GA pilots remain cognitively unable to assess, understand, and deal with diverse and adverse weather changes. Additionally, although pilots may be trained on handling sudden potentially drastic situations, they such training may not teach them how to identify abnormal events, as noted by Casner et al. (2012).
Pilots encounter and traverse diverse types of climates and run into all kinds of weather. Hence, what they do in such situations determines all aspects of their flight. This research was conducted to illustrate the need for identifying and communicating hazardous weather to improve pilot and passenger safety. This requirement is necessary because the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration’s knowledge tests qualify the pilots who fail in the test’s weather segment (Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, 2018). This practice produces pilots who have a minimal understanding of the critical aspects of meteorology. Hence, many pilots cannot deal with strong winds, vector around severe thunderstorms, and assess the impact of icing on flights. Pilots, stakeholders, and industry players, must improve the display of weather information to enable pilots of all categories to read and quickly interpret weather information. This demands in-depth assessments of pilot learning and training content to help pilots identify and deal with variations in weather patterns. Failure to make these improvements fast will continue endangering pilots’ and passengers’ lives unnecessarily.
Recommendations
To curb the occurrence of similar incidences, pilots must be trained to improve their decision-making capabilities when faced with sudden and drastic weather changes that require quick but rational thinking, as also recommended by Casner et al. (2012). Secondly, numerous types of error and threat management approaches must be incorporated into pilot instructional programs to teach them to deal with impromptu situations that may occur in flight. In the case chosen for this study, the pilot made an ill-advised decision to thrust himself into a storm. His incompetent thinking was also contributed by his misjudgment of a dangerous situation, most likely because of his underlying inexperience in handling storms and lack of instrument rating. Thirdly, the relevant regulatory agencies and key players in the aviation industry must design and strictly enforce sufficient operational guidelines to ascertain that pilots schedule their flying activities with the required professionalism and cognitive capacity. Besides, coordination between the meteorological providers and aviation industry is essential to evaluate and accordingly clarify the relevant aviation security policies and procedures. Fourthly, challenges and opportunities must be identified regarding providing regular digital illustrations of meteorological hazards. Such representations will assist in collaborative and cooperative decision making to foster safety in the aviation industry.
Coordination with the various air transport analysis groups is necessary to help assess the existing statistics to identify the primary aviation weather hazards. Research areas on these problems must be prioritized to advance the suitable roadmap concerned with developing intrinsic aircraft capacities. For instance, pilots can be provided with portable weather applications to improve their decision-making abilities, as suggested by Ahlstrom et al. (2016). Engaging in such intensive research and pilot training initiatives will generate effective connectivity solutions that will help disseminate crucial meteorological information in the aviation industry.
Conclusion
This study has examined the aspects revolving around the Pacific Ocean Aerospatiale AS350BA, N355NT helicopter crash. Major focus has been given to the need for pilots to obey seemingly simple rules as they literally determine if a fatal accident occurs or not. The pilot, in this case, launched head-on into a storm without even having the necessary instrument rating that would have helped him negotiate the aircraft successfully. The implication, as echoed in the essay, is that the crash was majorly due to pilot error. The analysis of this situation helped to show that many aviation accidents occur due to pilot error. In most cases, pilots injudiciously underplay seemingly minute rules in flight. For example, the pilot in the crash lacked the essential instrument rating that would have helped him navigate through a storm. Yet, he erroneously believed that he would rely on visual reference to steer the aircraft. Further, the accident would not have occurred if the FAA had diligently checked that the helicopter was not fit for flying in the area because it lacked the compulsory flotation equipment. An example of a similar incident that could have been prevented is the helicopter crash that took the lives of Kobe Bryant and his entourage. Although the pilot had the vital instrument rating to negotiate the adverse weather, he was legally restricted from literally saving the lives onboard. Hence, he could only rely on visual reference and on-ground assistance to navigate the poorly visible, mountainous area. Assessing these accidents has highlighted the need for increased collaboration between aviation industry agencies and key players in the meteorological industry to train pilots on identifying and managing various severe weather conditions. Additionally, industry regulators must review their operational guidelines and avoid denying pilots the critical right to use their discretion to salvage potentially dangerous situations. This study qualifies the need for further cooperation, consultation, and sensitization of all players in the meteorological and aviation industries to improve pilot training in identifying and handling harsh weather conditions.
References
Ahlstrom, U., Ohneiser, O. & Caddigan, E. (2016). Portable weather applications for general aviation pilots. Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 58(6). https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0018720816641783
Ayiei, A., Murray, J. & Wild, G. (2020). Visual flight into instrument meteorological condition: A post-accident analysis. https://www.mdpi.com/2313-576X/6/2/19/htm
Casner, S.M., Geven, R.W. & Williams, K.T. (2012). The effectiveness of airline pilot training for abnormal events. Human Factors:The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 55(3). 477-485. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0018720812466893
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (2018). General aviation pilots struggle to interpret weather forecast and observation displays. https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/04/180416185617.htm
Gallo, M.A., Alhallaf, H., Baran, S., Cremer, I., Finn, C., Maharaj, Ozyurek, A.S., Peker, E., Reese, B., Tuncman, I., Turgut, R.T. & Uhuegho, K.O. (2015). Inadvertent VFR-into-IMC flights: A qualitative approach to describing GA pilots’ first-hand experiences. 33(2). https://ojs.library.okstate.edu/osu/index.php/CARI/article/view/7450/6851
Ison, D. (2014). Correlates of continued Visual Flight Rules (VFR) into Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) general aviation accidents. Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, 24(1). https://doi.org/10.15394/jaaer.2014.1628. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3009/7431f371b255ab6e71c5459a3ff878df46f0.pdf
National Safety and Transport Board. (2007). Weather encounter and subsequent crash into the Pacific Ocean, Heli-USA Airways, Inc., Aerospatiale AS350BA, N355NT. https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/AAB0701.aspx
Philipps, D & Mervosh, S. (2020). Helicopter in Kobe Bryant crash wasn’t legal to fly in poor visibility.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/30/us/kobe-bryant-crash-flight-certification.html
Thomas, R.L. (2018). Effect of active learning on instrument rated pilots’ knowledge and self-efficacy. https://commons.erau.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1387&context=edt
Whitehurst, G. R., Brown, L., Rantz, W. G., Nicolai, D., & Bradley, J. M. (2019). The effect of experiential education on pilots’ VFR into IMC decision-making. Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, 28(2). https://doi.org/10.15394/jaaer.2019.1793. https://commons.erau.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1793&context=jaaer