PL 110-02 Module 5: Dualism, functionalism and eliminative materialism

PL 110-02 Module 5: Dualism, functionalism and eliminative materialism

Brie Gertler, “In Defense of Mind-Body Dualism”

In this selection Brie Gertler offers a provocative argument in favor of the thesis that minds are not physical. She contrasts this position with the physicalist theory that minds are identical to brains (or, more specifically, any mental state is identical with some brain state).

Her argument proceeds by describing the strategy for demonstrating the possibility of non-physical mental states. She poses a thought experiment involving attempting to imagine or conceive of a particular pain (that you inflict on yourself) as existing without any body. This is because, she argues, if one can conceive of something—in this example by imagining it—then that’s good evidence that it’s possible. She supports this idea with a number of examples.

Gertler then goes on to defend her argument from a number of possible objections. Chief among them is the objection that there are cases in which one can conceive of something that is in fact impossible—particularly when it’s discovered later to be impossible due to scientific progress. Gertler grants this but disputes the claim that these sorts of cases are analogous to her case of the feeling of pain since we can’t be wrong about the feeling of pain. This is because our concept of pain is not one involving a hidden essence—to know that we are undergoing the feeling is enough to know that we’re in pain.

Finally, Gertler considers two additional questions: how the dualist might answer the problem of mental causation and the problem of chauvinism that afflicts the identity theorist.

Prompts

1. Recount Gertler’s argument for dualism. Do you find it convincing? Say why or why not. What do you think would be the best way to object to her argument?
2. Gertler discusses both the problem of mental causation and the problem of chauvinism explain how these problems fit into her discussion of the nature of mind. Which of these problems do you think is more severe (if any) and what implications does that have for this debate?

Multiple Choice

1. What does the physicalist think about mental states?
2. They don’t exist
3. Some are physical
4. They are all physical
5. They are created by God
6. According to the Identity Thesis…
7. Every type of mental state is the same as some type of physical state
8. You are the same thing as your brain
9. Every type of mental state is caused by some type of physical state
10. Every time there is some mental state, there is some physical state
11. Identity statements concern…
12. What is likely
13. What will happen in the future
14. What is impossible
15. What we should expect
16. According to Gertler, if something is conceivable, then…
17. It is not surprising
18. It is possible
19. It is hard to imagine
20. It is conceptual
21. What is the point of Gertler’s discussion of the examples of witchcraft and right triangles?
22. They are cases where we can conceive of something that can’t (or don’t in fact) exist
23. They are additional cases that generate the same conclusion her pain example does
24. She dismisses them as not relevant to her argument
25. They are cases where our concepts are sufficiently comprehensive
26. According to Gertler…
27. Water might have failed to be H2O
28. Water does not have a hidden essence
29. Our concept of water is not like our concept of pain
30. We can’t conceive of water is not being H2O
31. Among other things, what does Gertler think about pain?
32. We can’t be fooled into thinking we’re in pain by feeling it
33. We need to check if our C-fibers are firing to know if we’re feeling it
34. We can’t learn anything new about pain
35. It’s not an example that should convince the physicalist
36. The strategy that the physicalist employs by bringing up mental causation involves contesting what?
37. The premises of Gertler’s argument
38. The reasoning of Gertler’s argument
39. Gertler’s motives in posing the argument
40. The conclusion of the argument
41. What is epiphenomenalism?
42. A satisfying result given dualism
43. The claim that mental causation happens
44. The idea that mental states do not cause behavior
45. A problem for the identity theorist
46. What is the problem of chauvinism?
47. A theory implying that too few things can have mental states
48. A theory implying that too many things can have mental states
49. A theory implying that nothing has mental states
50. A theory implying that everything has mental states

True/False

11. The argument for Gertler offers is very different from the one Descartes offers for dualism false. the two arguemnts are similar in all other aspects just the view of religious and spiritual implications in the descartes theory are not present here
12. Gertler holds that what it means to be physical is to be extended in space. true. she has addressed materialism which says that everything that exists is material or physical which is composed of physical particles like atom, quarks etc. all these require to be extended in space and are spatial in nature.
13. Gertler does not think that empirical investigations can show that something is impossible. false as she states it after her study that things which are scientifically impossible cannot be tesed imperically.
14. Correlation is the same relation as identity. false. correlation means that change in one thing causes change in other but identity theory says that two things are identical.
15. Gertler thinks her conclusion is at odds with modern science. true. in the end of the arguments chauvinism and mental causation are not addressed and identity a modern concept is contradictory to her argumment but theseconcepts cant be reasoned out in her theory.

Paul Chuchland, “Functionalism and Eliminative Materialism”

In this selection, Paul Churchland discusses two prominent physicalist alternatives to the Identity Theory. His pieces consists of a presentation of each view and various possible arguments that have been posed against them.

According to the Functionalist view, mental states are not to be identified with particular brain states but rather with functional roles that consist of the relations that each state bares to certain systemic inputs, behavioral outputs and other mental states. Churchland points out that this view avoids the problem of chauvinism since these roles can be played by all sorts of things depending on what system they are in. He goes on to discuss the problems of the inverted spectrum and absent qualia as well as various solutions.

Contrary to the Functionalist view, the Eliminative Materialist is also pessimistic about the prospects of neuroscience finding any identities between mental states and brain states but instead of posing a different view about what mental states are, the Eliminative Materialist suggests we should abandon them. Psychology, they argue, is not a science that should be preserved but rather eliminated in favor of a developed neuroscience. To argue for the view, Chuchland notes that psychology—with its attendant concepts of mental states of various sorts, has failed to progress significantly and points out a number of historical examples of instances in which scientific advance in a field prompted scientists to conclude that earlier concepts in fact picked out nothing in the real world. This, of course, led to their abandonment.

Prompts

1. Discuss how Functionalism differs from Identity Theory with respect to the problem of chauvinism.
2. Do you find Churchland’s response to Functionalism’s supposed problem with qualia to be satisfying? Why or why not?
3. Illustrate Eliminative Materialism utilizing an analogy (from science—the examples that Churchland uses—or another example of your choosing). Evaluate one of the arguments against the theory.

Multiple Choice

1. According to the functionalist, mental states are…
2. Roles
3. Feelings
4. Inputs
5. Brain states
6. Why doesn’t functionalism fall victim to the problem of chauvinism?
7. It denies the existence of mental states
8. Many different physical systems can realize the same functional roles
9. Functional roles are unlikely to be realized in non-humans
10. Mental states do not bear causal relations between themselves and other mental states
11. What is token identity?
12. Each mental state type is identical to a physical state type
13. Each mental state instance is identical to a physical state type
14. Each mental state instance is identical to a physical state instance
15. Each mental state type is identical to a physical state instance
16. Functionalism…
17. Isn’t very popular
18. Reserves a unique place for the science of psychology
19. Doesn’t have to do with cognitive science
20. Is identical to behaviorism
21. Why is qualia a problem for the functionalist?
22. Two systems could be functionally isomorphic and have different qualia
23. Two systems could be functionally isomorphic and one lacks qualia entirely
24. Both answers are correct
25. Neither answer is correct
26. How does Churchland respond to the problem of qualia?
27. He proposes that qualia are not essential to any mental state type
28. He proposes that qualia are not present in every instance of a mental state
29. He denies the existence of qualia
30. None of the answers are correct
31. What does Churchland propose qualia are?
32. They are identical to certain functional profiles
33. They are identical to certain physical properties
34. They are identical to certain mental beliefs
35. They are identical to certain spiritual properties
36. According to the eliminative materialist…
37. There are no mental states
38. There are no physical states
39. Both answers are correct
40. Neither answer is correct
41. What differentiates the examples of “caloric” and “phlogiston” from the cases of “the starry sphere of the heavens” and “witches”
42. The former two are concepts we still think pick out something in the actual world
43. The latter two are concepts we still think pick out something in the actual world
44. The former two are concepts that pick out something that we can’t directly observe
45. The latter two are concepts that pick out something that we can’t directly observe
46. If eliminative materialism is right, psychology will eventually be replaced by a mature…
47. Religion
48. Sociology
49. Philosophy
50. Neuroscience
51. Which of the following is NOT a failure of psychology according to the eliminative materialist?
52. Sleep
53. Learning
54. Intelligence
55. Qualia
56. According to the second argument in favor of eliminative materialism, what is the reason why psychology has survived while many of our other folk explanations of phenomena have not?
57. It’s correct
58. It’s explanatory
59. It concerns a very hard subject
60. All of the answers are correct
61. What is the first non-question begging argument that Churchland considers against the eliminative materialist?
62. Neuroscience isn’t sufficiently well developed yet
63. Everyone has introspective access to their own mental states
64. History has not demonstrated examples of conceptual elimination
65. Eliminative materialism is hard to believe
66. What is the problem with the argument that if eliminative materialism is correct, then a statement of the view is meaningless?
67. It assumes that knowledge is impossible
68. It assumes that true beliefs are the required for meaning
69. It assumes that neuroscience will fail to provide an accurate view of the mind
70. All of the answers are correct
71. What does the eliminative materialist have in common with the functionalist
72. They both believe that psychology gives an accurate picture of the mind
73. They both think neuroscience is pointless
74. They both think that mental states will not be type identical to brain states
75. They both are dualist views