IMPACT AND RECOVERY FROM MAN-MADE AND NATURAL DISASTERS (NEW ORLEANS’ RESPONSE TO KATRINA)
Hurricane Katrina occurred a few years after the September eleventh attack (9/11). During its occurrence, three years had already elapsed after the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) creation. However, a year before it occurred, the DHS had already developed a national response plan (Lewis, 2017, pp 28). Despite the enhanced homeland security attention, the kind of response New Orleans directed towards Hurricane Katrina was a failure. The packing winds of about one hundred and twenty miles per hour killed a large population of people, and half of the area residents were left trapped in attics and rooftops. The better parts of the city became flooded with water levels of up to 20 feet (Moynihan, 2019, pp 4). The raging waters and packs of wind caused severe damages to buildings in the area and infrastructure. The responders of the Government were in no positions to provide essential fundamental protection to the citizens from Katrina. Two Congressional report titles gave a summary of the failure sense. A select House Committee identified an initiative failure at the Governmental Affairs, and Homeland Security Senate Committee pursued a judgment on the US as an unprepared nation
For years, people in New Orleans sounded the alarm that there was some inadequacy in the city’s levee and flood poll control system (Lewis, 2017, pp 30). The levee system in New Orleans had been designed in such a way as only to withstand a level three hurricane and not a stronger hurricane like Katrina. However, there existed significant debates among New Orleans’ emergency managers on whether the levee system would be functional in case of a strong storm before Katrina stroke the city. It was, however, quite unfortunate that the construction of these levee systems that offered protection to the residents of New Orleans at lower levels had initially received inadequate funding. Many projects were left undone due to a cut in federal funding, and therefore, local engineers were at all not surprised when there was water surge into New Orleans. Thus, in general, the New Orleans’ response to Katrina was inadequate. The poor response was as a result of failure and inadequacy to take charge of several risk factors. There had been a lengthy consideration of the risks of a major hurricane hitting the better part of New Orleans. Sufficient warning and alarms on Katrina’s threat had been issued earlier on, and emergency declarations were passed in advance (Moynihan, 2019, pp 7). There was a failure in the conversion of this information into a preparation level by the responders. This conversion would have been essential when it came to preparing residents with the impending disaster scope. There was a further weakening of the response by the US intergovernmental system of response that was dispersed in nature. There was a failure in recognition of the urgency of active engagement by the federal responders, which called for an inadequate response to the disaster. In general, there was inadequacy at every governmental level in terms of the capacities of the primary institutions to adequately manage the response. The DHS, then, was an organization that had not been tested yet, and it was not sure of the appropriate method to deploy resources as well as its authority (Moynihan, 2019, pp 10). The inability to have an understanding of Hurricane Katrina as a significant national incident was DHS’s major failing. They treated it as a usual natural disaster up until it became severe.
The Mayor of New Orleans, Ray Nagin, was also a key player to the inadequate response to Katrina. He received some criticisms over the failure to implement his original flood plain. The mayor also ordered the residents to the last resort shelter without providing them with food, security, housing, and even the essential sanitary conditions. The most unfortunate part of New Orleans’ Katrina response with regards to the mayor was the delay in the order of emergency evacuation up until less than a day before the disaster hit New Orleans (Lewis, 2017, pp 35). The mayor technically refused to release the baby blue school buses to aid in the evacuation process, citing that the buses lacked insurance and that there were no bus drivers. Many people, in turn, died due to their inability to find a way out of the city. They remained trapped within the town where they met their untimely deaths.
There is a classification of New Orleans as a non-regime city. Both non-governmental and governmental cooperation make up a regime as well as resources to counter the problem and a specific plan. In New Orleans, however, there existed a temporary coalition in an attempt to deal with Katrina. This led to a brief, inefficient, and ineffective evacuation plan and resources provided.
Conclusively, New Orleans failed to respond to Hurricane Katrina adequately. The city was less prepared even in terms of the levees they had established, which were, at the same time, receiving little funding for maintenance. There also existed some inadequacy to take charge of several underlying risks in the city. The disaster was treated as a healthy disaster by the DHS in New Orleans. This led to a heightened magnitude of the catastrophe. The evacuation plan was also poor, and this led to the loss of many lives of citizens residing in New Orleans.
References
Lewis, J.A., Zipperer, W.C., Ernstson, H., Bernik, B., Hazen, R., Elmqvist, T., and Blum, M.J., 2017. Socioecological disparities in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina. Ecosphere, 8(9), pp 28-62
Moynihan, D.P., 2019. The response to Hurricane Katrina. International Risk Governance Council, pp.1-11.