Kegworth Air Disaster
Human factors contribute to more than seventy percent of airplane accidents compared to other factors. The errors are made by the flight crew, air traffic control, the maintenance personnel, and any other staff that is directly connected to the flight’s safety. Some of these human factors are unavoidable, especially if the captain or one of the flight crew members assumes the role on a different plane than those used to flying. January 8th, 2020, marked thirty-one years since the Kegworth air disaster killed forty-seven passengers on board and left seventy-four severely injured. The British flight 92, Midland Boeing 737-400, was headed to Belfast Ireland from Heathrow Airport before crashing into and embarkment in M1, thirteen minutes after the takeoff. Ideally, the plane had climbed to twenty-eight thousand feet when the fan blade’s outer portion on the left engine failed. This was followed by airframe vibrations, and compressor stalls on the faulty machine, which triggered fluctuations in the engine’s parameters, and fumes in the right deck.
The crew assumed the right engine’s fault due to the fumes and smoke from the passengers’ cabin and the loud bangs from the left engine. The crash resulted from the confusion because when the right motor was disengaged, the vibrations were terminated to confirm the troop’s prognosis. Also, the model 400 Boeing series worked differently compared to other versions. For instance, the ventilation system was not similar and, thus, the confusion on determining the faulty engine. Multiple human factors contributed to the Kegworth disaster, and some of them would have been handled before the flight. For example, captain Kevin Hunt stated that the passengers and the crew did not inform him of the era; the passengers could have reported their seats. Accordingly, the passengers believed that their contribution was of little effect to the captain since they were no piloting experts. Likewise, the cabin crew failed to report the issue to avoid distractions during the busy periods.
Similarly, the best performance was a mistake; that is, the pilot thought the bleed air was from the right engine, which was only applicable to the other Boeing models. Thus, when the engine was closed, everything went back to normal and lost control when more oil was pumped into the faulty machine, hence the blast, fumes, and final crashing. The captain is supposed to have full access to the plane, including visibility, instead of relying on the crew for information. From the broadcast, the captain and first officer admitted to having asked the team for confirmation, before reducing the thrust and shutting off the right engine. Lastly, the lack of communication and miscalculations also triggered the crash. The captain disengaged the auto-pilot and was flying manually, while the first officer unsuccessfully tried to the radio broadcast at EMA (East Midlands Airport) to gauge the weather. The last attempt to save the aircraft also failed after trying the “Engine Failure and Shutdown Checklist.” According to the captain and first officer, the options were not reinitiated after they suspended; before the takeoff, several ATC communications like descent clearance, heading changes, and radio frequencies could not be accessed.
The Kegworth incident changed the aviation industries universally to ensure safety takeoffs and prevent such accidents from happening. For instance, the cockpit management team went through thorough training to avoid any human factor issues. A review on the plane revealed that the passengers who had assumed a brace position sustained severe injuries, which was unlikely. Hence, new instructions on the brace position were generated. They include, the passengers must lean towards the front seats to shield from head severe head injuries due to the sudden thrust and excessive force following a crash. Besides, the passengers must put their legs and knees together while leaning to the front. This was different from the initial brace position where they had to lean forward with their legs lifted on the air.
Besides, efficient communication is encouraged between the crew, pilots, and passengers. The sharing of information will sanction the cabin team to confront the aircraft troop of any mistake regardless of the period they are engaged. Lastly, the flights must have graphic safety update cards behind every seat to remind the passengers of the safety measures in a malfunction. Well, social issues cannot be controlled primarily, the unexpected ones; however, it is best to observe the avoidable ones. Flight safety has increased drastically, and all the manufacturers, aviation companies, and all interested parties are often reminded to have the correct certification for passenger safety.