Case Study
Student’s Name
Institutional Affiliations
Case Study
Amendment IV of the United States is assimilated into the bill of rights. It is the Fourth Amendment to the constitution that was brought to Congress by James Madison in 1789. Among the critical issues in the amendment was the restriction of unlawful seizures and searches of suspected criminals and the prerequisites for the administration of warrants. A probable cause is nigh in the issuing of orders, which can only be given by judges or magistrates. A pledge or assertion should explicitly accompany a likely cause, clearly delineating the items or people to be seized or searched.
The determination of the arrest of a person, search, and seizure of properties, as well as the issuance of a warrant, are all based upon the probable cause. The United States criminal law defines probable cause as the extent to which police jurisdictions have a reason for asking for an arrest warrant for a suspect, or a search and seizure warrant. Therefore, for police claims to stick, the officer must have inarguable figures and facts to ascertain the commission or intent of commission of a crime at a particular potential search locale. Evidence at the given place is also a key reason to substantiate a search warrant. Also, a search warrant must at all times indicate the exact spot needing forage and the items to be obtained. The legality of a warrant is, therefore, only considered if the probable cause follows the guidelines outlined in the Fourth Amendment.
Like every rule, the probable cause too has exceptions. Some scenarios do not necessitate a probable cause or even a warrant—a situation like that of the United States vs. Place 1983 case, where drug-sniffing dogs were present at an airport in New York with DEA agents, is one good example. Place denied the agents the consent to search his luggage. The trained dogs alerted the agents of the presence of drugs in the bags, so they searched his bags. The court ruled the dogs as an efficient probable cause for conducting the forage, and Place was convicted for drug possession. Cyber scrutiny and surveillance were considered enough to raise rational doubt and suspicion for authorities to push for a warrant. Bank statements, credit card records, as well as communication data like emails, were some of the surveillance forms considered close to probable cause. Consent by an individual to a search is also another instance where a warrant is deemed unnecessary. However, this consent only upholds if the person consenting to the search has authority over the premises.
Prosecution of a defendant is intently reliant on probable cause for arrest, seizure, or even further probing in the form of scouting for evidence. This statement is true even for cases where the search was conducted with no warrant. The court, therefore, puts measures to bar the violation of the Fourth Amendment, an action like the exclusionary rule. This rule affirms that evidence obtained illegally or in violation of the Fourth Amendment is deemed inadmissible against a defendant in a court of law. The first witnessing of this rule coming into play was witnessed in the Weeks vs. United States case of 1914. Weeks was charged with conveyance of lottery tickets through the local mail, an offense contrary to the Criminal Code. The evidence presented was obtained by officers who did not show a warrant and, furthermore, only entered the premises without Weeks’ consent. He was acquitted, despite the overwhelming concrete evidence, the court citing the illegal acquisition of evidence against Weeks. The court felt that letting a guilty man go was the lesser evil than entertaining a violation of his rights according to the Fourth Amendment regarding the exclusion rule.
In the mentioned case study concerning the bad boyfriend Joe, he should not have any legal standing in objecting to the impromptu warrantless search since he does not officially own the house; he only lives there, but the house is in the name of his wife, Linda. The argument for Joe having his belongings in the house would not hold up in court since, in the records, he can only be a guest. The police’s exigent measures to barge into the house were very justified since the screaming was a cry for help in a home with children and a known women batterer. Joe has several police records, the most recent one being a case against his wife, Linda, for domestic violence. Despite the charges against Joe being dropped for the lack of testimony from Linda, his characteristics are seen to contain a pattern of abuse, which is also another justifiable cause for admissibility of the exigent circumstances. Besides, the cash and scales and the packaging material would be considered admissible in a court of law for being in plain view of Sergeant Rick Rodgers.
Joe and Linda’s daughter, nine-year-old Sara, is questioned by the police over the cocaine found in a dresser in Joe’s bedroom. She innocently reiterated that her father had the ‘white powder’, which he told her was for their mother’s surprise bubble bath and should be kept a secret. The cocaine is deemed admissible in court, given the parents’ previous records and the girl’s testimony. This is despite the circumstances that led the police into the house in the first place. There was, therefore, probable cause for the seizure of the items by the authorities and also the arrest of Joe. However, there was no reason why the police went into their bedroom since their probable cause was exigent circumstances emanating from screams from the house of a known batterer. This act would have been welcome if they had a search warrant, which is evident in the 1990 case of United States vs. Suarez, where the police only enter the house of the suspect upon obtaining a search warrant. The sergeant should have immediately left the premise upon determination of the cause of screaming.
References
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110, (1983).
United States v. Suarez, 885 F.2d 1574 (11th Cir. 1989).
Weeks v. the United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652, (1914).
Weinreb, L. L. (1974). Generalities of the Fourth Amendment. The University of Chicago Law Review, 42(1), 47-85.