Homeland Security Risk Assessment
The homeland security climate of the United States is dynamic and fills with conflicting needs, desires and opportunities that must be addressed and efficiently handled to ensure that key national priorities are achieved. The nation’s stability, stability and resilience are being threatened by a number of threats, including terrorist attacks, disruptive cyberspace operations, and pandemics, incidents caused by people, transnational crimes and natural disasters. Around the same time, home protection companies are responsible for handling risks related to personnel training, acquisitions and project costs. Such external and internal threats together can cause loss of life, injury, adverse psychosocial effects, degraded the environment, loss of economic activity, reduced capacity for missionary functions and loss of public confidence. This various home safety threats are understood and handled by DHS and its partners (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Risk Management and Analysis, 2011). We live in a complex and uncertain environment in which the past is not a comprehensive guide to the future. Furthermore, systems that perform essential functions for a prosperous society are deeper and closer together.
This report starts with the assessment of illustrative techniques and frameworks of risk analysis by the Committee. Then some general strategies are addressed to improve these skills.
In assessing the quality of the methodology of the risk survey Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – item an of this study’s Statement of Task – we need to differentiate between the overall concepts of DHS and the numerous current implementations (Vellani, 2006). The Department has built processes under the former group, which promote focused discussions of risks, vulnerabilities and implications and has created a risk-conscious culture. For instance, a rational first step is the interim Integrated Risk Management Framework (IRMF) which integrates risk lexicon and analytic guidelines (primers). The National Plan for the Protection of Infrastructures (NIPP) has properly developed, reproducible, documented, defensible and completed risk assessments.
Many of the methods in the DHS arsenal for risk analysis are in fact sufficient if used properly, and hence the Committee believes that DHS lacks no specific risk analysis skills in certain areas of its mandate in response to Element statement of task. Danger = A function of hazard probability, vulnerability, and repercussions (risk= f (T, V, C) is also concluded in the Committee that Danger is a conceptual construct to divide risk into its parts. Such a systematic approach to risk analysis from natural and man-made hazards isn’t new and for several years, the special risk case = f (T, V, C) to C has been at different stages of development and refining. The committee concludes, nevertheless, that Risk = f (T, V, C) is not a suitable method for estimating risk in the field of terrorism, for whom there is usually no freedom from possible threats, vulnerability, and effects or feedback (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Risk Management and Analysis, 2011). In general, conditions of probability distributions of T, V, and C can be calculated to capture interdependence and can also be multiplied in order to determine risk, but feedback — how choices affect one variable to others — cannot be so easily described. Based on the study of the Risk analysis of natural hazards, vital infrastructure safety and homeland security grants; DHS embedded risk management process and Terrorism analysis and management (TRAM) and Biological Threat Risk Assessment (BTRA) methods and further submissions to the Committee by the DHS, the implementation of the System for Risk = f (T, V, C) occur in various ways. The Committee noticed in its interactions that several models and procedures of DHS risk assessment are weak — for instance, due to an unfair complexity which undermines its clarity and hence its effectiveness for risk management and its readiness to validate — and are not on a path to strengthen. In the majority of instances the core criteria for the risk evaluation outlined above were not met, in particular in terms of transparent, reproducible, documented, and defensible objectives (Reifel, 2006).
Recommendation: DHS will reinforce its analysis methods such as reporting, testing and pair reviews by professional experts other than DHS in order to gain an understanding of the complexities of its terrorist risk analyzes (the information that will push potential improvements). This enhancement would also make the risk modelling and analysis of DHS much more clear. While part of the enhancement of best standards, DHS will also strengthen the internal capacity for risk assessment.
In general, it appears ideal for decomposing danger (danger) and arranging information. In addition, DHS has developed models, data processing and processes of conducting a risk analysis for some of its missions. The system is structured to define risk assessment (risk function (T), possible threat (V, and consequences) (C) and risk (R = f(T, V, C))). However, the committee did not find any risk analysis capability and methodologies that are still adequate to support DHS decision-making, with the exception of the risk assessments for preparedness against natural disasters, due to their validity and reliability. Furthermore, it is not yet apparent that DHS is on a road to developing methods and capabilities that are appropriate for accurate, other than natural disaster risk assessments to be ensured.
References
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Risk Management and Analysis. (2011). Risk Management Fundamentals Homeland Security Risk Management Doctrine. Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/rma-risk-management-fundamentals.pdf
Reifel, C. (2006). NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS Approved for public release; distribution unlimited QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY RESOURCE ALLOCATION. Retrieved from https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a462640.pdf
Vellani, K. (2006). Strategic Security Management A Risk Assessment Guide for Decision Makers. Retrieved from https://www.threatanalysis.com/SSMIntro.pdf