How have the theories of Henri Jomini influenced the birth of combined arms warfare?
Jomini is a military contributor with writings that have become a fundamental part of military operations today. Jomini developed his prototype ‘Principles of War’ by studying the military strategies of Napoleon and Fredrick the Great[1]. Jomini later redefined the strategy of Napoleon and Fredrick into one principle that underlies all the operations of war, a law to follow in all suitable combinations. Utilitarian-military educators readily used his straightforward appeal as it was simple and ensured successful events in battle. Jomini’s principles of war have stood the test of time and influenced the birth of combined arms warfare. For instance, it has led influenced the combined arms organizations to incorporate different arms and weapon systems together for war.
Jomini’s first theory was the principle of objectivity. He based the argument on the maxim that for success, an army has to strategically locate the mass of an army upon individually decided points. The move, when applied in a theater of war, would cripple the enemy and lead to victory. For successful results, the strategy was dependent on identifying the communications of the enemy without compromising one’s transmission as much as possible[2]. The theory influenced the rise of combined arms warfare as identifying the communication of the opponent is dependent on the use of developed radio communication systems, light signaling blinkers, and competent engineers. While combined, the weapons and instruments used in a war would ensure the protection of one’s army while at the same time give the military an upper hand against its opponents.
Jomini’s second theory was the principle of mass. He came up with a maxim that an army has to engage fractions of the enemy’s army as much as possible while fighting with the majority of its own. The strategy applies to modern warfare, where the elements of surprise and security are essential for the army to remain focused on the reduction in casualties. Jomini’s simplistic approach seems to be counter-intuitive, leading to a need to assess each situation uniquely[3]. The theory contributed to the birth of combined warfare as the combined use of infantry, and army aviation was instrumental in identifying the weak points of an enemy and engaging them effectively. Militarily this suggests that the physical quantities remain intertwined with psychological forces that impact the military action. Jomini’s theory argues that the fundamental human passions contribute to the energy and the spirits of the military event leading to an influence on the results. The view conspires to assert that warfare is a combined element. Each facet of the army’s feature had its basis on a wide range of components, including emotion.
Jomini’s third theory is the principle of maneuver. It got developed on the maxim that an army should focus its attack on the weak and defenseless areas in the enemy lines. Jomini referred to the regions as decisive points. The principle of maneuver works by movement of large troops to advantageous positions to destroy enemy forces. For the theory to be useful, the army had to be aware of the terrain, which was critical in positioning troops to exploit the vulnerability and the weakness of the enemy[4]. The theory contributed to the birth of combined arms warfare as it pointed to the importance of infantry and armor to support players in a battle. Combined arms warfare helped in achieving the goals of the theory as helicopter units assisted in the surveillance of an area, and the findings would then require them to bomb or shell that area through a bomber, fighter, aircraft or naval forces. By asserting that everything is uncertain in war, this argument is basing itself on the fact that calculations must be made with variables in mind for an army to be successful in battle.
Jomini’s fourth theory was the principle of surprise. He based the argument on the maxim that an army had to economize its force such that it could focus its effort in attacking, preferably by surprise, the decisive point with considerable power. Jomini viewed war as an excellent drama for military geniuses and heroes to combine talents and transcend the mundan[5]. To do that, the leadership of the army had to adapt the element of surprise. The principle was incorporated in the combined arms warfare, as is seen in the updated Army regulations related to strategic inclusion across all levels. It seems to show as Jomini’s aim was utilitarian-military educators readily used his straightforward appeal. His work in translation and commentary allows for his point of view to be straightforward. These elements lead to a substantial contribution to educational theory in the military.
Jomini’sfifth theory was the principle of deployment. Jomini stated that the implementation of troops or equipment in a place of war was effective in ensuring success in a battle. Jomini produced a military cookbook where he said that war should get planned to ensure success. Jomini’s solutions are straightforward and allow for a measure of success in a substantial number of military situations. The theory applies to combined arms warfare as an army can deploy fewer military soldiers but complement them with the necessary artillery and firepower. As Jomini stated, success in war is dependent on leadership[6]. The theory led to the birth of combined arms warfare as military leaders got tasked with the duty of coming up with thoughtful approaches to war in the second world war. The U.S. came up with the concept of the marine-air ground task force, which combined marine aviation and mar4ine ground units for expeditionary missions. Jomini’s theory argues that the fundamental human passions contribute to the energy and the spirits of the military event leading to an influence on the results.
The sixth theory is the theory of artistic war. The argument rests on a need for the realization of lessened casualties and heightened concentrations of strength against weakness. Jomini argued that enhanced weaponry and attacking techniques of an army, the army could become more successful. Examining the theory provides the military leaders of today with the experience of those that have come before. Learning the best viable way to leverage this information into success remains a possibility for every new generation of military leaders. The theory led to the development of the TRADOC approach, which reflects simultaneity and endurance in the combined arms warfare[7]. Militarily this suggests that the physical quantities remain intertwined with psychological forces that impact the military action.
Jomini’s seventh theory was on proper army leadership. He stated that intellectual leadership would lead to simplicity and speed in battle. He praised the Napoleonic strategy of a quick victory, which was achieved by speedily amassing troops. For this theory to be useful, Jomini believed that political interference was not necessary for war. He suggested that governments should choose the best and most qualified commander and give freedom to the commander to wage war in the manner he deemed necessary. He believed that natural leadership and intellectual training was the combination that would lead to a victorious battle[8]. The theory led to the birth of combined arms warfare as leaders were instrumental in combining different weapons of war and different systems.
In conclusion, Jominis theories focused on simple strategies and tactics that contributed to the birth of combined arms warfare. The theories led to the combined arms warfare as it led to the incorporation of infantry, army aviation, mobile protected firepower, and joint capabilities in ensuring a victorious battle. His doctrines absorb and reflect the practical approach of the modern military. The ongoing development of inclusive strategy basing itself on Jomini’sapproach seems to be successful. Understanding how Jomini’s theories contribute to the combined warfare continues to reflect his value. The increasing complexity of the modern battlefield reflects the continued inclusion of his approach. A combination of emotional aspects to military actions illustrates one of the primary variables on the field. Understanding based on experience allows Jomini’s theories to reflect the value of each Soldier. Avoiding unnecessary engagement in favor of finding decisive points of weakness, Jomini demonstrates how practical, simple policy and strategic approach can become.
Bibliography
Ankersen, Christopher. “Combined arms.” The Encyclopedia of War (2011).
Bassford, Christopher. “Jomini and Clausewitz: their interaction.” vol. 26. 1993.
Craig, Gordon, and Peter Paret. “Makers of modern strategy.” (1986): 326.
De Jomini, Baron. “Summary of the Art of War.” (1954): 329.
Huber, Thomas. “Explaining The Revolution”. Jomini, 2020.
Sheftick, Gary. “Army Operating Concept Expands The Definition Of Combined Arms”, 2014.
Training, U.S. Army, and Doctrine Command. “The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World 2020-2040.” (2014): 525-3.
[1] Ankersen, Christopher. “Combined arms.” The Encyclopedia of War (2011).
[2] Sheftick, Gary. “Army Operating Concept Expands The Definition Of Combined Arms”, 2014.
[3] Bassford, Christopher. “Jomini and Clausewitz: their interaction.” In The Clausewitz Homepage, http://www. clausewitz. com/CWZHOME/Jomini/JOMINIX. htm, an edited version of a paper presented to the 23rd Meeting of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe at Georgia State University, vol. 26. 1993.
[4] De Jomini, Baron. “Summary of the Art of War.” (1954): 329.
[5]e Craig, Gordon, and Peter Paret. “Makers of modern strategy.” (1986): 326.
[6] De Jomini, Baron. “Summary of the Art of War.” (1954): 329.
[7] Training, U.S. Army, and Doctrine Command. “The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World 2020-2040.” (2014): 525-3.
[8]. Huber, Thomas. “Explaining The Revolution”. Jomini, 2020.