How Just War Theory can be used to evaluate a Concept of Legitimacy Applied to the Operations of Non-State Actors in Conditions of Conflicts or War, A Case of Somali Pirates
Introduction
Somalia with the absence of a stable federal government, security apparatus, and the rule of law has over the last three decades been left to its devices, an undertaking which saw the country slowly become engulfed by violence and civil unrest (Lucas Jr, 677). The failed state in the Horn of Africa country, coupled with the proliferation of insurgent factions such as Al-Shabaab, and regional warlords have led to the overflow of the insecurity in the mainland into its coastline, with multiple high value cargo shipments been captured by pirates in the nation’s high seas (Lucas Jr, 677). The involvement of Non-State Actors such as the NATO which in October 2008, deployed the NATO Maritime Group-2 (SNMG2) as a response to the growing incidence of piracy in the Somalia coast, and the tribal chiefs, warlords and Al Shabaab, has brought to the limelight questions on whether such groups are justified to take action in such a region (Riddervold, 546).
The involvement of the Non-State Actors (NSA) has been based on the assumption that the modern warfare has evolved and it is no longer restricted to states, with the 9/11 attacks and the ongoing wars in Syria, Afghanistan, and Libya been realities of the changes that have taken place in warfare (Lucas Jr, 677). However, it is understandable that these groups of actors have in their possession sophisticated weaponry, and technology which they can use to cause far-reaching damage in the areas they operate, thus the question on whether the actions of the NSA working in Somalia coast fighting piracy are justified under the Just War Theory.
Background of the Study
Non-State Actors have become a crucial payer in the modern-day wars that are taking place in various parts of the world, an aspect which is attributable to the changes on the modern state system (Finucane, 35). Although the Non-State Actors have remained a crucial pillar in the fight against challenges such as terrorism, the frequency with which they use force has remained alarming and a source of concern for scholars, policymakers, nations, and world leaders since they challenge the norms of war (Pham, 133). One country that has been widely affected by the rise of NSA is Somalia, and which has over the last three decades been bedeviled by violence and civil unrest as various factions in the nation have tried to rise to power, and subdue the other warlords operating in other territories within the state (Pham, 133).
The fall of the Said Barre regime in 1991 has been pointed out by innumerable scholars as the primary cause of insecurity proliferation in the region, with various nations and radical groups have taken the opportunity to arm warring factions within the country, in an endeavor to ultimately control whoever rises to power, and the predominant religion (Pham, 133). Although the intervention by the NSA actors has helped ensure that the incidence of piracy in Somalia coast reduced, has been questioned severally with concerned parties arguing that the parties should not be allowed to use military force in the region since they do not have any justification to do so (Riddervold, 546). The establishment of whether the Just War Theory justifies the intervention made by the NSA groups such as NATO is crucial since it ensures that the activity that the group carries out in the nation is compliant to the doctrine of war (Riddervold, 546).
Statement of the Research Problem
The ethics of war is still an integral part of waging any form of warfare around the world since the parties involved have to get support and credibility, failure to which their actions become a source of scrutiny and ridicule by other nations worldwide. Somalia has for long been characterized by piracy along its coastal waters, an activity which has seen various countries with shipping routes along the coast take action to mitigate the abduction of their shipments by the pirates (Lucas Jr, 677). The statistics from the International Chamber of Commerce’s Piracy Reporting Center (ICC-PRC) indicate that the incidences of piracy along the Gulf of Aden grew gradually since the start of 2000, with the number of reported incidents reaching 35 in 2006, and peaking in 2008 when 63 incidents of hijacked vessels were reported (Riddervold, 546).
The growing concern about the state of insecurity along the Gulf of Aden, and the Eastern coast led to the launch of several joint force actions by neighboring countries under the auspices of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), with European nations such as Denmark and NSA groups such as NATO also getting involved (Lucas Jr, 677). The main issue of concern is whether the involvement of various Non-State Actors Bodies such as the United Nations and NATO in Somalia is appropriate and justifiable under the Just War Theory and whether the criticism of these groups operations in the area are legitimate (Riddervold, 548). The rise in the activities carried out by the NSA is a phenomenon that is unlikely to end any time soon, with the various actors that are involved unlikely to be held accountable by the laid down structures that control an ensure accountability from the state’s involvement in such military operations.
Objectives of the Study
The research seeks:
To examine the place of Non-State Actors intervention on the issue of piracy in Somalia coastline and whether it is rational under the Just War Theory
To establish the implication of the Non-State Actors intervention on the Just War Theory and other areas of conflict
Justification of the Study
Although the role of Non-State Actors in war-torn regions have been examined previously, the studies did not explore the intervention made by the groups in Somalia, and the impact their operations had on the nation’s stability, and regional peace. Somalia, although currently operating under a new regime, it remains unstable with incidences of violence, and terrorist attacks taking place even in the capital city, Mogadishu (Dua, and Ken, 749). Secondly, although there have been innumerable efforts made by nations such as Ethiopia, the United States, Kenya, and international bodies such as the United Nations, the European Union, and humanitarian organizations to help address the issue of insecurity in the country, little progress has been made (Schneider, and Matthias, 185). Although the prevalence of shipment hijacking has declined with the increase in sea patrols along with the attack-prone areas such as Gulf of Eden, the problem persists, and some piracy and kidnapping still take places in the country’s coastal waters (Dua, and Ken, 749).
The research study seeks to explore how the involvement of Non-State Actors such as NATO, although a welcome relief to the deteriorating situation poses concern since the operations of the Non-State Actors are unregulated and do not fall under the jurisdiction of state bodies that can hold them accountable (Schneider, and Matthias, 185). The case of Somalia piracy which is orchestrated by clans, Al-Shabaab, and other factions, which are been fought by joint government taskforces, and the NSA groups, will prove to be a significant influence on whether Non-State Actors actions are legitimate under the Just War Theory, or there is a need to develop a new war doctrine. The research will help policymakers, researchers, and educationists understand the complicated relationship between the Just War Theory and Non-State Actors in war-torn regions.
Literature Review
The section is comprised of two parts, one dealing with the analysis of literature on Just War Theory, Non-State Actors, and Piracy in Somalia, and the second which explores the theoretical framework of the study.
The Just War Theory
The Just War Theory can be traced back to several thousands of years ago, although the modern-day doctrine has evolved and matured to its current version over the last millennium (Stupart, 76). The Just War Theory was developed as a means to strike a balance between the immorality of war such as civilian casualties, and the need for an individual or state to defend their sovereignty, and property from attacks (Schneider, and Matthias, 185). The knowledge that warfare in all its form must be carried out based on justifiable reasons, and yet fought on the battleground based on the contradictory and yet morally legitimate reasons, has been used over the years by leaders to decide whether a given battle is worth fighting or not. The Just War Theory is based on a dualism of Jus ad Bellum, and Jus ad Bello, which are mutually independent aspects of war and which outline how any attacks should be carried out (Stupart, 76). The independence of the two elements, Jus ad Bello, and Jus ad Bellum are crucial since it ensures that an unjust war is not fought justly, and just war is not carried out through the use of unfair tactics (Stupart, 76).
The Jus ad Bellum is composed of six elements which include: a just cause, proper authority, proportionality, last resort, probability of success, and right intention, while Jus Ad Bello encompasses proportionality in terms of military, and discrimination (Stupart, 76). The establishment of the Treaty of Westphalia led to the rise of the modern-day system in which nations have sovereign jurisdiction and control over their territories under their control, as well as the citizen population, with foreigners warned about crossing the set state boundaries. In the event of a disagreement between two nations, the Just War Theory is used to determine whether an attack is justified and what actions can be taken by the two justifiable parties (Lucas Jr, 677). Although the end of the World War II led to the creation of the United Nations (UN) a body charged with ensuring global peace, countries have still found themselves engaged in war with their neighbors, with their civilians, and at times foreign states involved in a war that is taking place outside their jurisdiction (Lucas Jr, 677). For instance, the United States has been involved directly and through proxies in tens of wars since the end of World War II outside its boundaries and territories, all under the guise of ensuring global and regional stability.
The changes that have taken place over the last half-a-century in statecraft, world order, and warfare have led to the development of supranational bodies, and Non-State Actors with an immense influence that at times exceeds the capabilities of some individual nations (Finucane, 35). For instance, the proliferation of terrorism in recent decades has seen countries start establishing joint taskforces aimed at addressing the threat of transnational terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda, Al Shabaab, an ISIS, which have become a threat to the stability of various regions such as the Middle East, Horn of Africa, Sahara area, and Europe (Finucane, 35). The intentions of these groups although divergent and not limited to political or religious ideologies; they have all meted out violence on civilians, disrupted trade, destroyed infrastructure, and in rare circumstances overthrown legitimate governments (Finucane, 35). Besides, the high incidence of terrorism in the world today than it was a century ago, the rise of powerful warlords, and secession groups in unstable countries around the world have led to the spread of anarchy in these states, as well as to the neighboring nations (Dua, and Ken, 749).
Somalia is one of the nation’s that have been afflicted by both terrorist groups, and warlords disguised as clan leaders and pro-secessionists (Coggins, 98). The country has gone through an elongated period of civil unrest during which regional governments serving the interests of wealthy warlords with arms, and the support of foreign states with benefits in the nation rose to power, and supported anarchy in their controlled territories (Coggins, 98). The aftermath of the failed statehood in Somalia has been the entrenchment of Al Shabaab which although having been fought over the last eight years by joint forces from nations such as Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, and Ethiopia among others remains a threat to the young country (Bueger, 1811). Besides, the new regime that was formed after the term of the transitional government came to an end, has failed to unite all the regions, with some areas such as the Jubaland advocating for secession from Somalia.
The lack of a stable government, functional military, and rule of law has seen the country that was once a promising nation in the 1970s and 1980s descend into anarchy and a haven for criminals who wish to make quick money by hijacking cruise ships, and other vessels using the Indian Ocean (Bueger, 1811). The rise of the insecurity and its later escalation at the start of this millennium to affect the shipping lines at the Somalia coast meant that the international community had to become involved (Coggins, 98). In addressing the piracy menace that was affecting the Gulf of Aden, and the Eastern Coast of Somalia, various task forces such as the ICC-PRC, and Non-State Actors such as NATO have launched operations designed to address the problem through the apprehension of the hijackers, and even offering of escort to the high value cargo (Coggins, 98). Although the operations of the Non-State actors and the state actors in the country have remained a contentious subject, the former has received more scrutiny taking into consideration that it is not bound by treaties and principles that govern the overseas operations of government-sanctioned endeavors (Dua, and Ken, 749).
Non-State Actors in the 21st Century
Although the history of humankind is littered with countless examples of groups opposed to governments and which serve various agendas, over recent years a new trend has emerged in which different supranational bodies have formed military wings that they use to exert their will and influence in areas of strategic interest (Pham, 325). The emergence of Non-State Actors who are armed with latest technologies and sophisticated weaponry has changed the dynamics through which war is waged, with these groups getting involved in various covert and overt military operations that a few decades ago, they would not have taken part (Fisher, 174). The Non-State Actors that have merged in the 21st century include among others international bodies such as the United Nations, NATO, and armed militias such as warlords, mercenaries, and armed tribal chiefs (Fisher, 174). Although some of the Non-State Actors have been integrated into formal structures of statehood, and are allowed to operate as independent bodies in war-torn regions, others lack the legal integration into the formal institutions within a nation, an aspect which makes them a threat to the country’s and regional stability (Pham, 325).
Although the Non-State Actors engage in various activities to support their operations in the different regions where they operate, they are ambitious groups that leverage military to perpetuate war and attacks against other factions operating within their area of jurisdiction (Guilfoyle, 141). For instance, the various warlords, tribal chiefs, and groups such as the Al Shabaab working within Somalia, have used their position and the resources that they receive from foreign nations to carry attacks on opposing groups, as well as grow their influence. The success of the militias in Somalia, and to fund their high seas operations through which they orchestrate hijacks, the warlords and other criminal gangs have primarily relied on the support they receive from nations such as Ethiopia, United Arabs Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, which are sympathetic to their cause (Guilfoyle, 141). The sponsorship or sanctuary that the militia groups in Somalia such as the tribal warlords that orchestrate the interethnic wars, and support the pirates, have thrived as a result of the resources from their benefactors who are willing to meet training and recruitment costs for new members (Guilfoyle, 141).
The Non-State Actors within Somalia although having played a role in the fall of the Said Barre regime in 1991 as his rule came to an end in January, 1991, the various tribal chiefs, and warlords were not considered a threat even by the neighboring countries which were wary of the civil unrest spreading to their territories (Bueger, 1811). However, the continued operations of these groups, the proliferation of radical movements within the country, and the kidnapping of tourists from neighboring countries such as Kenya, and the hijacking of ships along its coastal waters, meant that the Non-State Actors started drawing the attention of both regional and international communities (Lucas, 55). The Non-State Actors unlike other players at the global stage, who are bound by laid down procedures and principles such as the Just War Theory, act in total disregard of the law which poses a significant threat to the global community and neighboring nations (Lucas, 55).
The acts of violence committed by the various Non-State Actors are thus disproportionate with those determined by states which are bound by the Jus ad Bello, and Jus ad Bellum principles, meaning that the groups are more likely to commit severe atrocities and human rights abuses than any other civilized state which seeks to control and regulate them (Lucas, 55).The rejection of internationally recognized standards of addressing disputes by these actors’ means that they act unlawfully and with complete impunity when meting out justice whenever they feel aggrieved, or even when they seek retribution for any crime committed against them (Guilfoyle, 141). The little care and competitive threats that the Non-State Actors perpetrate towards other states located beyond its borders have always been the most significant source of concern, and a reason for a military response from these countries which is meant to subdue the NSA before they escalate and become more challenging to deal with (Lucas, 55). For instance, the retaliatory invasion into Somalia by neighboring nations such as Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia through AMISOM, was meant to ensure that a government was established, and the incidences of insecurity did not escalate beyond its borders to its neighbors.
Non-State Actors and Piracy in Somalia
The occurrence of attacks on ships off the Somalia coast since the start of the 21st century grew gradually from an isolated event to an issue that demanded the attention of the international community to resolve. The proliferation of piracy along the Gulf of Aden and the eastern coast would ultimately see the problem come under discussion during a 2008 United Nation’s security council convention where resolution 1816 of 2008 was passed, authorizing various states to enter the Somali territorial waters as they did in the high seas (Bueger, 1811). The recommendations passed and adopted during the United Nations Security Council were informed by the need to safeguard civilians and the interests of nations that used the high seas bordering the Somali coast by giving them protection and dealing directly with the pirates operating from Somalia shores (Bueger, 1811). Although since the passing of the resolution various initiatives have been adopted by joint taskforces to address the piracy menace, and notable success has been realized through reduced incidents of hijacking, the problem has not been fully exterminated (Schneider, and Matthias, 185).
The causes of piracy in Somalia have been an issue that has been examined by various scholars over the years, to establish what factors led to the development of the iniquity, and later its proliferation to a menace that caught the attention of the international community (Bueger, 1811). The most important cause of the privacy within the Somali coast is the existence of anarchy, weak security apparatus, and justice system, and high unemployment among the locals, which pushed them over the edge (Bueger, 1811). The lack of a functional government to regulate what happened within the nation’s borders, meant that radical groups took advantage of the lapses in security and set up operations in the country, with the jobless population perceiving piracy as a means to get quick money and a better life in a country that was in turmoil (Pham, 325).
Work Cited
Schneider, Patricia, and Matthias Winkler. “The Robin Hood narrative: a discussion of empirical and ethical legitimizations of Somali pirates.” Ocean Development & International Law 44.2 (2013): 185-201.
Stupart, John. “Jus Ad Bellum and intervention in Somalia: why a military response can still work.” Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies 39.2 (2011): 76-98.
Riddervold, Marianne. “New threats–different response: EU and NATO and Somali piracy.” European security 23.4 (2014): 546-564.
Bueger, C. (2013). Practice, pirates and coast guards: The grand narrative of Somali piracy. Third World Quarterly, 34(10), 1811-1827.
Lucas Jr, George R. “New Rules for New Wars International Law and Just War Doctrine for Irregular War.” Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 43 (2010): 677.
Lucas, Edward R. “Somalia’s “Pirate Cycle” The Three Phases of Somali Piracy.” Journal of Strategic Security 6.1 (2013): 55-63.
Guilfoyle, Douglas. “The laws of war and the fight against Somali piracy: combatants or criminals.” Melb. J. Int’l L. 11 (2010): 141.
Pham, J. Peter. “Putting Somali piracy in context.” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 28.3 (2010): 325-341.
Pham, J. Peter. “Somalia: Where a State isn’t a State.” Fletcher F. World Aff. 35 (2011): 133.
Fisher, David. “Morality and war: Can war be just in the twenty-first century?.” Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies 40.2 (2012): 174-177.
Coggins, Bridget L. “Rebel diplomacy: Theorizing violent non-state actors’ strategic use of talk.” Rebel Governance in Civil War 98 (2015): 98-118.
Dua, Jatin, and Ken Menkhaus. “The context of contemporary piracy: the case of Somalia.” Journal of International Criminal Justice 10.4 (2012): 749-766.
Finucane, Brian. “Fictitious states, effective control, and the use of force against non-state actors.” Berkeley J. Int’l L. 30 (2012): 35.