International Human Rights Law
Executive Summary
This report highlights the legal and policy implications of Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) allegations against the UAE’s military operation in Yemen. The merits of the charges are questioned based on existing international humanitarian and human rights laws. The claims made by the allegations are proven to lack sufficient grounds to warrant an investigation. Notably, the spontaneous nature of events in the particular scenario absolves UAE forces of a deliberate contravention of humanitarian rights. Furthermore, the grounds for cruelty in the handling of insurgents are proven to lack sufficient credibility. Based on the conclusions of the report, a response is recommended to assert the UAE’s position on the allegations be made to the HRW. Furthermore, actions such as public communications and review of human rights policies in the UAE military should be undertaken to mitigate the effects of a possible HRW publication.
Allegations leveled against the United Arab Emirate’s armed forces operation in Zinjibar testify to the growing international law and human rights complexities emerging from the conflict in Yemen. The development of a credible defense to the allegations rests on a detailed understanding of the applicable international legal regimes. First, the conflict that continues to rage in Yemen falls into a non-international armed conflict. The Geneva Conventions (1949) prescribe that international armed conflict requires the involvement of more than one sovereign state. In the present case, there is little ground in international humanitarian law to back the argument that the Houthis assume the identity of an authority meeting the criteria of a separate state. As such, Yemen’s conflict falls into the category of non-international armed conflicts between a state government and a non-state actor. The Yemen conflict also meets the requirements set out for non-international conflict in terms of the scope of hostilities and level of organization. Granted, the Yemen conflict involves several state actors, such as the UAE. However, given that the conflict is not one between two state actors per sei, the definition remains one of a non-international nature. Regardless of differences between international and non-international conflicts, international humanitarian laws apply in the same shape and form.
Role of the UAE in the Yemen Conflict
International law is quiet on the issue of external involvement in armed conflict. Nonetheless, the scope of participation in the conflict serves as a useful indicator of engagement. As things stand, The UAE’s military involvement in the Yemen conflict is undoubtedly apparent. The UAE’s role in this regard may be conceptualized as the direct organization and coordinating of military operations. These activities, triggered by the Houthi occupation of Yemen, are, to a great extent, a self-preservation response given the perceived threat of a Houthi regime. Understandably, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States felt concerned over the maneuvers by the Houthi rebel force involving long-range Scud missiles. The states also considered the rise of the Houthi rebels set the stage for greater Iranian involvement in the region.
Place of International Human Rights Law in the Yemen Conflict
Players in the Yemen conflict, such as the UAE are required to uphold international human rights provisions. Granted, armed conflict situations are primarily subject to the provisions of international humanitarian law. Nonetheless, even in such cases, international human rights laws impose certain obligations upon parties to the conflict. For example, the UAE and other actors in the Yemen conflict are subject to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. These conventions can be said to affirm guarantees to the fundamental liberties prescribed for within international humanitarian law.
Notably, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes that periods of conflict curtail some rights. However, this admission accompanies the provision that such limitations in fundamental rights be only to the extent that they are necessary and temporary. Furthermore, fundamental rights such as that of life, and protection from degrading treatment are unconditionally upheld regardless of the circumstances.
Applicable International Humanitarian Laws
Common Article 3 and Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions Act impose the most significant international humanitarian law obligations upon parties to the non-international conflict in Yemen. These laws impose a host of requirements on parties:
Civilian Protections
First, the UAE military’s actions purported to raise concerns regarding the contravention of civil protection provisions laid out by Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (1949) obligates parties to a non-international conflict to meet specific minimum requirements. For example, the law demands that persons that are either not part of the hostilities or those rendered incapable of conflict due to injury or sickness be treated humanely. Article 3 also bars parties to such disputes from effecting inhuman treatment upon people based on characteristics such as race or creed.
Requirement to Warn Civilians of impending Attacks
Second, the UAE is likely to be questioned over why a civilian structure was attacked without the issuance of sufficient evacuation notice. Additionally, Protocol I and II (AP1 and AP2) (1977) outline specific provisions that protect civilians from harm emanating from military operations. For example, Additional Protocol I and II demand that where possible, planned military operations be accompanied by warnings to civilian warnings likely to be affected. The specifics of such warnings depend on the demands of the specific situation. Nonetheless, the law requires that special consideration is made for the amount of time needed for the civilians to evacuate the area to be affected by the operations. Indeed, where evacuation notifications that fail to give adequate time would be declared ineffective. Furthermore, an evacuation notice does not portend the freedom to neglect the civilians. The law also warns against the misuse of evacuation notices as a tool for forced displacement. In a nutshell, attacking forces have to exercise all necessary precautions to protect civilians’ lives before initiating a military operation.
The protections of these laws upon civilians extend to objects deemed to be characteristic to civilian populations such as schools. This requirement is especially essential to the present issue where a military attack was directed at a school. According to Additional Protocols I and II of the Geneva Convention, facilities associated with civilian use such as schools, hospitals, and other similar structures enjoy protections similar to those assigned to individual civilians. However, international law protections are deemed lost when these facilities are used for activities outside of their original humanitarian purpose. Even so, the law requires that military operations only occur when a warning has been issued and a reasonable amount of time allowed.
Rights of People in Custody
Fourth, the issue of how the UEA military treated detainees comes into question. Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva conventions prescribes certain protections for people held in custody during non-international conflicts. These protections extend to both combatants and civilians in such disputes. More specifically, the law imposes limitations on cruel practices such as violence, torture, extra-judicial convictions, or delivery to the enemy. Notably, the ban against the inhuman treatment of other human beings stands as one of the concepts of conflict covered by both international human rights and humanitarian law. Both these legal regimes affirm that no single scenario can allow for the circumvention of laws against such practices as torture.
Part 2
Whether to reply to the HRW letter and if so at a general level what to say
The allegations put forward by the Human Rights watch against the UAE’s actions in the Yemen conflict are credible enough to merit a response to the HRW letter. The UAE’s operations in the Yemen conflict undoubtedly make the Gulf States a significant party to the conflict. Impliedly, the UAE is expected to comply with the instruments of both international humanitarian law and international human rights law. The facts available from the case reading indicate that there are possible violations of both humanitarian and human rights law.
There are several critical areas to be addressed in response to HRW’s letter. First, it is essential to affirm the UAE’s commitment to comply with all international human rights and international humanitarian laws. Second, the response should address the codes of practice followed in handling the Zinjibar event. For example, clarify the specific circumstances of the day to eliminate misleading inconsistencies. Third, reiterate willingness to collaborate to and bring the issue to a final close.
Key messages to be prepared for UAE public communications concerning the HRW report when it is published
In response to the HRW’s allegations, the first crucial public communication message is to affirm the UAE’s commitment to promoting universal human rights principles in the Yemen conflict. Second, the UAE should act fast to present an alternative narrative that will prevent the consumption of the anticipated HRW report as the gospel truth. Notably, periods of conflict often generate propaganda designed as a psychological weapon against the enemy. As such, the UAE should shed light on the specific encounter that forms the basis of the HRW’s allegations. The overall goal of public communication would be to provide substantive evidence sourced from credible sources regarding the issues raised by the HRW’s claims.
Whether the UAE has any arguments to discourage the Committee Against Torture from taking this issue up
There are several lines of defense for the HRW’s allegations. First, the UAE actions at Zinjibar did not breach Additional Protocol I and II civilian welfare protections. The attack on the school was in nature an unplanned response to violent agitation from insurgents. In such circumstances, the issuance of an evacuation warning would not have been possible. Second, allegations of cruel practices against the surviving insurgents are unfounded. The action against the enemy involved basic incapacitation using plastic restraints around the hands and blindfolding. Importantly, the cruel interrogation conditions required by the Committee Against Torture to make blindfolding a form of cruelty were absent (United Nations, 2000).
Finally, the argument that the insurgents were handed to the enemy lacks merit considering the current balance of power in Yemen. Arguably, the rebels fighting against the government lack sufficient grounds to claim a state of sovereignty. Furthermore, the local authorities, to whom the insurgents were handed, derive power from the state.
Any steps that MOFAIC may take with other UAE ministries, including any key questions to ask about missing factual information
Consider establishing a human rights committee for the Yemen engagement. MOFAIC and other UAE ministries have a duty to ensure that the Yemen’s military operation is founded upon the rule of law and respect for international humanitarian and human rights laws. One possible response for MOFAIC is to collaborate with other ministries to review human rights policies within the UAE military effort in Yemen.
Expand reporting guidelines. Require regular reporting on human rights performance in the UAE’s operations in Yemen.
Engage in public communications. The allegations leveled against the UAE by HRW introduce the risk of international disrepute. As such, the collaborative effort can also take action to influence public perceptions by affirming state commitment to protect human rights even when engaging in the Yemen war.
References
Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949.
Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977.
United Nations. (2000). Report of the committee against terror. https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cat/pages/catindex.aspx