Personal Identity
The question of survival, in which personal identity is a matter of life and death, literally: as far as possible, the answers to it decide the circumstances in which we live or end up existierating in the course of those adventures. Theory about personal identity tells us if it is possible to live by gaining complex cognitive ability in our development from the fetus to the
adult or if we have survived automobile accidents, whether we are in chronic vegetation. Theoretical adventures are not as thrilling as the cases that we shall address later about human fission and brain swapping. Moreover, the
ories of personal identity are of considerable ethical and conceptual impact: they can endorse the rationale of or rejection of incest or euthanasia in conjures with certain moral premises, or they can confirm or fabricate certain facets of our faith, in determining whether we can be resurrected or if we are ourselves.
Thus, it is not shocking that most major philosophers have tried to solve or commit to
a philosophical structure which has a significant impact upon the issue, and that most systems of beliefs specifically address the question of continuity. Nor is it surprising, if only in terms of beliefs about the afterlife and death, that virtually everybody has a pre-theoretical identity theory. The challenge of tackling the metaphysical issue of the personal identity is to answer essentially the
question of how the phenomenon or principle under which “entity such as ourselves” persist over time, under the generally accepted but not universally recognized premises, is to be specified and specified.
Personal identification is usually a person’s only numerical identification over time. It ensures that a person at one time may be said to be the same person and that an individual will remain the s
ame for some time (Vance 1). It is difficult to determine if one physical body is at a time identical to the other
physical body. For people, our bodies mature and evolve, lose and accumulate matter, and the majority of objects they once consisted of do not consist of for years. The persistence of the personal i
dentity in the continuing existence of our bodies through the time is therefore problematic.
We are just the
same individual to the degree that we are aware of the action and reflection of the past and that we are aware of the
thinking and actions of the present. If consciousness is the “thought,” which “goes with the same individual” content, then personal identity is based only on the repeated act of consciousness? For example, you can claim to have the same soul substance as Lincoln’s reincarnation. Even so, only if one had the same knowledge of Lincoln’s thoughts and actions as he had himself would one be the same person as Lincoln. The soul is thus not the source of self-identity (Thiel 96). There can be various identities of one soul. John Locke found a consciousness-based personal identity.
Although we have evolved in several ways, the same person tends to be present at that moment. We may begin to think about attributes without altering the underlying selves. However, Hume denies that there is a difference between the various characteristics of an individual and the enigmatic self, which supposedly carries them. Hume contrasts the soul with a State that preserves its identity by being composed of several distinct, connected yet continually evolving components, not by virtue of permanent central material (Thiel 100). So it is important to describe the loose unity of personal experience. Such will address the question of personal identity. Conscience can be transported from one material to the other and thus consciousness remains the same while the soul is changed, and so the personal identity is preserved by change. On the other hand, consciousness may be lost in complete oblivion while the mind or thought material remains the same. There is the same soul, but another person, under such conditions. Such arguments amount to the argument that the same soul or thought substance for personal identity is overtime neither necessary nor appropriate.
To be sure, it is important to grasp the principle of numerical identification to differentiate between circumstances in which something is picked more often than once or more. While the exact resemblance is, by concordance, a requirement of diachronic personal identity, the continuity of an individual over time is either necessary or sufficient in synchronic personal identity: at different times two slices of the individual may be qualitatively the same slices of the individual or qualitatively different bits of the person.