SOVEREIGN IS HE WHO DECIDES ON THE EXCEPTION

      SOVEREIGN IS HE WHO DECIDES ON THE EXCEPTION                             The term "political theology" can mean anything because all theology may be taken to mean "political." In other words, some ideologies in contemporary societies may be considered to be political religions. Schmitt's argument offers another point of view. He asserts that political theology is a term that can refer to the structure of political concepts like democracy, sovereign, dictatorship, which have a close relationship with theological concepts (Lombaard, 2019). Religion plays a significant role in most societies, as most of their institutions reflect their religion. However, there are those societies where religion only plays a secondary role. Therefore, it will be an overstatement to conclude that all political concepts are theological concepts that have only been secularized (Vincent, 2017). Carl Schmitt makes persuasive or convincing arguments as far as the relationship between religion and political thoughts is concerned. However, some scholars and politicians think that Schmitt's argument is mistaken. Schmitt argues that the political sovereign is a notion of God transferred to the modern political realm. He says that it is a theological notion that finds its place in the political. He considers it a total and final authority that a person or an institution has in making decisions in extreme emergencies. This person or institution (in whom the ultimate power of the state lies) is called the sovereign bearer or an “exception-bearer” (Schmitt, 2005). The Absolute is also a theological concept that is applied in as far as conceptualizing the Absolute in the state is concerned. This notion starts with the divine rights that the kings have over their subjects and extended to the crisis that took place during Schmitt's time. Schmitt's idea of political theology connects very well to his way of thinking. However, it may not be misleading to argue that his connection between politics and theology is one that can be considered to be one-sided or somewhat misleading in itself. For instance, he begins by examining political theology during Bodin’s times. According to Gray (2007), he also tries to explain the absolute theory and practice of the monarchy, and at the same time, he ignores earlier experiences in Europe. His choice of the historical period, as the opening of his study, is significant since knowledge on the relationship between politics and religion in the society was diminishing during that time. People did not pay much attention to the "divine right" doctrines. Therefore his work helps in understanding not just politics through theology but also theology through politics. Schmitt believes that political concepts in the modern states were formed from political theology. These political concepts are not only conceptually but also structurally the same when compared to those concepts in theological systems. Schmitt involves an abstract God in his explanations. This God is considered omnipresent or all-knowing. He states that in this God’s system, miracles are possible (Schmitt, 2005). However, Schmitt does not mention any historical concrete, the resurrection, various prophets, creation acts, or divine history. He uses God as a sociological construct. He reigns a metaphysical understanding to explain how political theology shaped society. Schmitt views the application of the theological concept of the sovereignty of God when trying to present to the state the political sovereignty model. He sees exception as a significant aspect of a polity. It is important to remember that an exception is not a routine situation in any state. Therefore, the sovereign authority was not only bound by a valid legal order in the normal situation but also transcended that reality. In a normal situation, the sovereign is slumbering but only wakes up when there is a threat to the normal situation – an exception. The new decision of the supposed deified entity turns out to be significant when the sovereign assumes the aspects of divine sovereignty. Not everyone can decide whether there is an emergency or not and whether this emergency deserves an exception or not –it is only the sovereign bearers. Sovereign bearers are individuals or institutions charged with the responsibility of declaring the existence of a state of exception. Just like God, the holders or sovereign can make necessary decisions without being interfered with, and these decisions are considered sole authority and final (Tralau, 2011). Schmitt holds that sovereignty that has been diluted and diffused a liberal democracy system because of the immanentizing patterns of the 19^th century do not have the capacity to decide. Schmitt attempts to describe the development and evolution of the theory of the state. However, he only makes a normative pronouncement on the same. He stresses the importance of dealing with major emergencies, which he claims that can only be normalized with the state of exception. Other scholars have supported this argument arguing that the system or style of governing, which does not consider the significance of relevant decisions during dreadful emergencies are not equipped to handle any disaster (Arvidsson et al., 2016). The state cannot successfully combat threats coming her way if it puts a lot of emphasis on the individuals and not on the state and the political. Schmitt sees this failure as being an indictment of contemporary liberalism. The dichotomy emerging, when defining the political, makes Schmitt criticize liberalism. He says, “the specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy” (Schmitt, 2005 p.26). In modern liberal constitutions, it is not common to see people acknowledging the holder or bearer of sovereign authority. Nevertheless, modern constitutional and legal theory have attempted to address this concept. Schmitt argues in his book, Political Theology, that any attempt of getting rid of sovereignty is not an endeavor that can lead to success. He adds that the absence of sovereign authority means that the legal order is not functioning (Schmitt, 2005, p.33). Most liberal constitutionalists believe that certain aspects of the legitimacy of the state must implement legal norms. In this case, the citizens will only be the predictable and determinate of the law and not to the hypothetically random or subjective authority of individuals (Schmitt, 2005 p.23). This argument does not consider the general legal norms cannot guide determinately without considering interstitial and interpretation legislation (Schmitt, 2005 p.29). Therefore, the law can only be considered effective when there is a need for an authority that decided how general rules are applied primarily to concrete cases. The general rules must also guide on how to handle issues emerging from contested under-determination or interpretation. However, the legal material content does not decide the interpreter or executor of the law by itself. As a consequence, Schmitt (2005 p.32) argues that there is a need for a sovereign authority to precede the law to guide its application in particular cases as far as general legal norms are concerned. Schmitt's argument assumes that all aspects of legal norms are just material norms that offer substantive grounds for making a legal decision. However, contemporary legal institutions and systems normally have competence norms apart from material norms. Therefore, it appears that the assumption that all legitimate political authority relies on legal approval is not as exposed as suggested by Schmitt (Kaufmann, 1988, p.341). For any material legal norm, the law can decide the institution or person with the capacity or competence not only to interpret the law but also to apply it. The subjects of the law have to acknowledge the fact that sometimes the ultimate decision may be binding to all, however wrong or right it may be. Rendering to Vinx (2013), Schmitt is on point by trying to appeal to the Hobbes's pronouncement in this limited sense that truth does not make the law, but authority does. Therefore, it is not viable to argue that the legal system provides an authoritative interpretation, through its norms of competence, of material legal norms. However, it must entail a sovereign in its operations for it to be complete. According to Schmitt, a general social normality condition is presupposed by the applicability of legal norms (p.13).  Rendering to Hoffman (2002), an extreme case of emergency cannot be governed by any legal norm. This fact includes the state of exception. One can expect unpredictable and haphazard results from the judiciary and administrative channels when the law is continuously applied in absolute circumstances. This approach will prevent effective action as far as prevent an emergency is concerned. According to the argument presented by Schmitt, the polity is required to make a decision on whether to call off the application of the law in abnormal situations (Bradley and Cerella, 2016). This can only be done if the applicability of material legal norms precedes the condition of normality. Therefore, the state exception is determined by the sovereign. The sovereign is an institution or person who has the power of totally suspending the law and after that, use extra-legal power to bring the situation to be normal in a given polity (Schmitt, 2005 p.5). In conclusion, the state of exception is considered to be any legal order that is brought about not by a legal norm but a sovereign decision. Rendering to Vinx (2010), it is possible to establish a legal condition that can facilitate one to declare a state of emergency. Similarly, it is perfectly possible to introduce legal constraints on the acceptable channels which can be used to deal with an emergency. However, Schmitt argues that any effort to legalizing the exceptional state is bound to fail. For instance, it is not possible to project the nature of emergencies in the future to decide beforehand the means or channels that may be used to deal with them. Consequently, the positive law provides an opportunity for determining the person or institution to make a decision whether the situation at hand will require a total suspension of the law (Schmidt, 2007). The existing law material cannot guide the sovereign decision. According to Schmitt, it is not necessary for the law to define the sovereign as far as the exception is concerned. According to Meierhenrich and Simons (2016), sovereign authority can still exist even in a situation where the positive constitutional law does not recognize – this is possible in a case that is relevant jurisprudentially. The most important thing is that the institution or person has the ability to decide on the exception. Similarly, positive legal recognition will not be necessary for the sovereign to suspend the law since the applicability of the law relies on the restoration of a normal situation. Koskenniemi (2016) observes that the power to decide on the state of exception is the same as that of deciding the conditions facilitating the state of exception. This is true in a situation where the decision of the sovereign on the state of exception is not constrained by any material law (Norris, 2007). The view of the sovereign here must respond to the existing social attitudes. However, it is important to note that such a decision by the sovereign of suspending the law must be supported by the majority of his constituents – especially those who are not just powerful but also influential. Needless to say, a sovereign decision will only be applicable is a society faced by serious social and ideological conflict. However, in a society where there is no unanimity among social groups regarding the decision that should be taken by the sovereign, the sovereign will have no choice but to side with the conception of the normality of one group at the expense of the other group. In other words, the creation of the sovereign regarding the condition of normality entails the political identity of the community. Sax (2002) observes that there is also a possibility of a sovereign to use forceful suppression to the group whose conception of normality is different from that of the sovereign. Schmitt agrees that then the idea of democracy is the only legitimate idea available as an ideological foundation for the modern constitution. We must give a democratic interpretation to the conception of sovereignty, as argued by Schmitt, to make it defensible. However, this task may not be easy because the only candidate for sovereignty, as far as democratic polity is concerned, is the sovereign seen to be popular. This sovereign is made up of politically equal individuals. Schmitt's sovereign definitely cannot be a popular sovereign because all its decisions will be guided by established constitutional laws that define how the citizens form a unified will as a collective entity (Kelly, 2016). In Schmitt's view, sovereign dictatorship is exceptionally a democratic institution. The only way a sovereign dictatorship is possible is in a situation where the circumstances allow for the decision on the exception to do it for the people (Herrero, 2015). Therefore, Schmitt concludes that sovereign dictatorship is not just central to democracy but also compatible with it. It is exercised wherever and whenever the interests of the people are threatened as opined by the constitution of the land. However, the argument that a democratic constitution does not or cannot give an individual in power sovereign authority does not hold because the individual has not been denied to make genuine sovereign decisions on behalf of the people (Steinmetz-Jenkins, 2011). It only means that the sovereign decision regarding the exception has been substituted with the exercise of the constituent power of the people in a democratic state. Some scholars have criticized Schmitt's arguments arguing that he is hostile against liberal de-politicization. For instance, Vatter et al. (2014) argue that Schmitt's arguments are anchored in the perception that it is a theological duty to differentiate between a friend and an enemy. However, Schmitt observes that most of the significant concepts of the contemporary doctrine of the state are all theological concepts that have only been secularized. This argument, therefore, means that any political theory using such concepts must be founded in theology (Schmitt, 2005 p.47). In conclusion, Schmitt's attack on the concept of liberal democracy – exception – is exaggeratedly specific. The concept of exception is problematic for any democratic society. For instance, the exception may turn out to be an issue because of non-state-oriented conflict. Even throughout the medieval period, the question of who has the capacity to decide on the state of exception between the imperial authorities and the papal authorities was in itself an issue of conflict (Bredekamp, 2017). Also, some reformed theology is aiding the subordination and reduced reliance on the church or theology.                       Work Cited Arvidsson, M., Braennstroem L., and Minkkinen, P. (eds.), 2016, The Contemporary Relevance of Carl Schmitt. Law, Politics, Theology, Abingdon: Routledge Bradley, A. and Cerella, A., 2016. 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