Practical Exercise# 2- GEOINT
Introduction
Current intelligence information shows a terrorist group identified as Al Shabaab is planning to attack the Washington, D.C Metro subway stem and power stations. The most potential targets for the attacks are the North Power Plant and the Metro Center stations. Two metropolitan police districts, District Six and District One, will enable rapid response to the attacks. Nevertheless, the two metropolitan police districts could affect response is required from the surrounding locations. Further, the Department of Homeland Security as well as the Office of Infrastructure and Protection will be critical in preventing or helping the country recover from the attack.
Given the potential attack, geospatial information (GEOINT) remote sensing methods, both non-imaging and imaging sensors will be needed to detect the movement of terrorists as well as the changes that are likely to happen to the metro stations and the power stations. Because the metro stations are located in densely populated areas, reporting of any changes and the terrorist movement will suffer if proper integration with other intelligence areas is not properly done. GEOINT can provide maps with detailed information about the possible routes that the terrorists could use and surveillance their potential areas of attack. Although the GEOINT information can provide the possible routes, the images fail to provide the specific intention of the attackers and the time of the attack.
To understand the form of attack that is likely to be perpetrated at the power stations and metro rail system, it is imperative to understand the background of the terrorist group. Al Shabaab is a terrorist organization that was formed as a result of political unrest in Somali. The terrorist organization comprised of members from the young generation whose aim is to develop” Greater Somalia” under the fundamentalist Islamic law.[1] Al Shabaab normally uses strategic terrorism attacks to carry out its attacks. Nevertheless, the terrorist group lacks adequate funds and capacity to uphold a strategically-minded technique hence they depend on guerilla welfare.[2] Due to the limitations that are associated with this terrorist group, it is more likely that the five terrorists planning an attack on the power stations and metro stations in Washington, D.C will target densely populated areas and are likely to attack when people are busy in their daily activities.
According to the information provided by the informant, at least five masterminds are planning for the attack. This information sheds light that the five men may be used to perpetrate as many as five attacks on the same day. Nevertheless, the attack on the power stations may need at least two people to cause a maximum impact. The attack on the subways may be carried out by one person at every station. Using an analysis of the previous Al Shabaab attacks, it is evident that the members of the terrorist group use grenades and guns on soft targets as a way of creating a huge number of causalities in a strategy they term as “determination and good planning”.[3] Although it is believed that Al Shabaab has weakened over the years, there is no sufficient information to prove this information.
It worth noting that Washington, D.C is well-populated with government officials, tourists, and locals making the most suitable location for soft targets. The three metro stations that stand out as perfect targets include Lenfant Plaza Metro Station, Metro Central Metro Station, and Smithsonian Metro Station. The three metro stations have similar characteristics making them the potential targets for terrorist attacks. For instance, all three metro stations have more than one transiting line located in crowed areas while the entrances to the stations are located in another structure increasing the abilities of the terrorist to attack a greater crowd. With a huge crowd, it is less likely for the attackers to be spotted by security or to be noticed by the people. However, the North Power Station is more likely to be attacked than the South Metro Station for the same reasons. From the Google map images, two main roads travel along the North Power Station boundaries and the other part is surrounded by a body of water and housing making it possible for the attacker to operate easily without being noticed.[4] Although the terrorists are likely to use suicide bombing and firearms in the metro station, improvised explosive devices would be more effective in the North Power Plant. The image below shows the metro stations that are likely to be attacked by Al Shabaab.
Likely Routes
Two major routes can lead to the backside of the North Power Station. The two routes need to utilize the trail found in the areas. However, the route marked with color blue is most suitable since it starts close to a residential area and near a park. While using this route it would be easy to hide explosives in a small backpack and look inconspicuous. The other route that is marked in orange has a less accessible entry point and it would also be time-consuming. Identifying the exact target and routes is more sophisticated compared to power plant attacks. The attackers are likely to employs attack techniques that they have previously used. For instance, they are likely to use a pattern they used in Westgate in Nairobi, Kenya. They will first appear as commuters and use public vehicles that travel through the power stations they are targeting.[5] This technique will increase the capacity of the attackers to move freely around the city undetected. Additionally, these route decreases the ability of GEOINT to identify the actual train or location which the attack will happen. Nevertheless, GEOINT plays a critical role in preventing deterring and recovering from the attacks. The image below helps to identify the likely route that can be used by attackers.
GEOINT Sensors
Research shows that remote sensing approaches can offer rapid, useful, and cheap assessment in support of intelligence information gathered via human and signal intelligence (Beck, 2003). Fundamentally, remoting sensing provides more accurate intelligence information on the IEDs situated in the North Plant Station. One of the limitations that are likely to be experienced while monitoring the metro stations is that it would be important to obtain imagery intelligence. Activated imaging and video surveillance would be deemed important to detect any form of disturbance on the grounds in the power station. However, this type of sensing would only provide partial information. Mid-infrared laser spectroscopy and pulsed laser surface are in a better position to detect more changes on the ground. Even though these forms of remoting senses are still in their piloting stages, it is in a position to detect hazardous and explosive materials on the targeted location.[6] The sensing devices would need to be placed somewhere close to the IEDs approximately 10 meters to be successful. The most suitable location would be behind a building close to the targeted trail because the IED will require to be 10 meters to cause great damage. The sensors can also be placed in the tunnels near the metro stations that are highly targeted. The method would offer earlier interventions in case the attackers decide to use the IEDs rather than their predictive methods. Though there are numerous ways to perform remote sensing to safeguard North Power Plan, the protection of the areas becomes even more sophisticated.
Numerous types of remote sensing can offer real-time warming on potential attacks. Nevertheless, these capabilities may not be effective enough to completely prevent the attacks and they could be more expensive. One of the methods that could be used is using an approach that can sense explosive residue, gas, solid, or liquid left in the fingerprint using hyperspectral imaging.[7] Particularly, partial -least squares discriminate analysis, commonly known as PLS-DA could help to detect explosives residues. Since it is not possible to tell where the Al Shabaab attackers will board the trains, this type of remote sensing will need to be placed in several ticketing terminals. Even though this can be a successful plan, implementing it in the entire city of Washington, D.C could be expensive hence impractical.
One of the most effective ways in which PLS-DA and HSI can be implemented is by the use of a technology developed by Trex Enterprises. The organization developed a remoting sensing device called Sago ST510 with a capacity to detect certain hidden firearms.[8] The device also has its share of strengths and weaknesses. The sensing device can operate in proximity greater than five meters and it would not be needed in every ticketing station but rather at the main entrances. The Sago ST510 would also be in a position to detect IEDs placed in tunnels by the al Shabaab. Since the operation will be performed in crowded places, the greatest disadvantage is that many people will be screened giving a probability of false alarms for people carrying permitted firearms.
While the GEOINT helps to detect the changes happening in the targeted areas as well as explosive devices, it lacks to identify the intention and specific location until some hours before the attack. SIGINT has given information about the affiliated terrorist groups and the targeted locations. The combination of GEOINT and SIGINT may allow to narrow down the focus and even uncover the particular location of the terrorist group. Additionally, the HUMINT can supplement what is provided by SIGINT and GEOINT. Although HUMINT provided little information, it is possible to obtain more as the day of the attack approaches. The HUMINT and SIGINT information will be needed for GEOINT to detect the exact locations and times the attack will be carried out. This would also allow disseminating critical information to the Homeland Security Department and District police before the attack is perpetrated.
The Response of the Police
The police offer is the last people who will ensure the safety of the people and organized for the recovery after the attack. According to Buckley (Buckley, 2013), law enforcement agencies fail to identify the nature of terrorism and ways of countering the threat.[9] Both District One and Six are effective in property crimes and they have only managed to deal with approximately 10% of violent crimes. Despite the challenges, the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) has taken adequate measures to increase their reaction abilities. The intelligence agencies have formed the Joint Operation Command Center (JOCC) which comprises of the MPD and other government officials. The JOCC will be used during and after the attack.
Essentially, the JOCC obtains support from other districts and helps to reduce confusion among law enforcement agencies. After the attack, none of the districts go without extra assistance. The JOCC also helps to improve the coordination with the DSH by supporting the “16 critical infrastructure sectors” The First District will ne be required to respond to the attacks on the North Plant Stations and the metro station attacks while District Six will be needed to respond on the metro station attacks. District Six has more specialized units as well as mobile forces units than District one.[10] This will be an added advantage to the Al Shabaab group since District One has more limited capabilities. It is also unknown whether the Al Shabaab members are aware of the impact on law enforcers.
In summary, the success of preventing the members of Al Shabaab from attacking the power plants and metro stations depends on the collaboration of various intelligence agencies, the JOCC, and MPD districts. Although District Six has a bigger team its coordination with JOCC can help to minimize the chances of the attacks. Additionally, a collaboration with the government organization enhances the ability to track and monitor the movement of the terrorists.
Bibliography
Beck, Richard A. 2003. “Remote Sensing and GIS as Counterterrorism Tools in the Afghanistan War: A Case Study of the Zhawar Kili Region.” Professional Geographer 55, no. 2 (May 2003): 170-179. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, EBSCOhost (accessed March 8, 2018).
Buckley, John. 2013;2014;. Managing intelligence: A guide for law enforcement professionals. 1st ed. Baton Rouge: CRC Press. https://www-taylorfrancis-com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/books/9781466586444 (accessed March 7, 2018).
Downie, Richard. 2014. “Al Shabaab: How Great a Threat?” Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly: 81. https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/docview/1473660661?accountid=8289 (accessed March 5, 2018).
Felter, Claire; Masters, Jonathan; and Sergie, Mohammed Aly. 2018. “Al-Shabab.” Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab (accessed March 3, 2018.)
Fernández de, la Ossa, José Manuel Amigo, and Carmen García-Ruiz. 2014. “Detection of Residues from Explosive Manipulation by Near Infrared Hyperspectral Imaging: A Promising Forensic Tool.” Forensic Science International (Online) 242: 228-35. doi:http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy1.apus.edu/10.1016/j.forsciint.2014.06.023. https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/docview/1615789375?accountid=8289.
Google. Google Maps. https://maps.google.com (accessed March 6, 2018).
Mair, David. 2016. “Westgate: A Case Study: How al-Shabaab used Twitter during an Ongoing Attack.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. Vol 40. Issue 1. https://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1157404?scroll=top&needAccess=true (accessed March 6, 2018).
Yinon, Jehuda, ed. 2007. Counterterrorist Detection Techniques of Explosives. Oxford: Elsevier Science. Accessed March 7, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central. https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/lib/apus/reader.action?docID=299066&ppg=106# (accessed March 7, 2018).
[1] Claire Felter et al. 2018. “Al-Shabab.” Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab (accessed March 3, 2018.)
[2] Ibid Claire Felter et al., 2018
[3] Richard Downie. 2014. “Al Shabaab: How Great a Threat?” Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly: 81. https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/docview/1473660661?accountid=8289 (accessed March 5, 2018).
[4] Go to Google. Google Maps. https://maps.google.com (accessed March 6, 2018).
[5] David Mair. 2016. “Westgate: A Case Study: How al-Shabaab used Twitter during an Ongoing Attack.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. Vol 40. Issue 1. https://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1157404?scroll=top&needAccess=true (accessed March 6, 2018).
[6] Geiser Bauer et al. 2006. “Pulsed laser surface fragmentation and mid-infrared laser spectroscopy for remote detection of explosives.” Applied Physics B: Lasers & Optics 85, no. 2/3: 251-256. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed March 8, 2018).
[7] la Ossa Fernández de et al. 2014. “Detection of Residues from Explosive Manipulation by Near-Infrared Hyperspectral Imaging: A Promising Forensic Tool.” Forensic Science International (Online) 242: 228-35. doi:http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy1.apus.edu/10.1016/j.forsciint.2014.06.023. https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/docview/1615789375?accountid=8289.
[8] Jehuda Yinon, ed. 2007. Counterterrorist Detection Techniques of Explosives. Oxford: Elsevier Science. Accessed March 7, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central. https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/lib/apus/reader.action?docID=299066&ppg=106# (accessed March 7, 2018).
[9] John Buckley. 2013; 2014. Managing intelligence: A guide for law enforcement professionals. 1st ed. Baton Rouge: CRC Press. https://www-taylorfrancis-com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/books/9781466586444 (accessed March 7, 2018).
[10] Ibid John Buckley